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Abstract
The fact that voters can manipulate election outcomes by misrepresenting their true pref-
erences over competing political parties or candidates is commonly viewed as a major aw of
democratic voting systems. It is argued that insincere voting typically leads to suboptimal voting
outcomes. However, it is also understood that insincere voting is rational behavior as it may
result in the election of a candidate preferred by the voter to the candidate who would otherwise
be selected. The relative magnitude of the welfare gains and losses of those who benet from
and those adversely a¤ected by insincere voting behavior is consequently an important empirical
issue. We address this question by providing exact asymptotic bounds on the welfare e¤ects, in
equilibrium, of insincere voting for an innite class of democratic rules. We nd, for instance,
that preference manipulation benets one-half to two-thirds of the population in three-candidate
elections held under rst-past-the-post, and one-third to one-hundred percent of the population in
antiplurality elections. These bounds di¤er from those obtained under out-of-equilibrium manip-
ulation. Our partial identication analysis provides a novel approach to evaluating mechanisms
as a function of attitude towards risk, and it has practical implications for the choice of election
rules by a mechanism designer facing a worst-case or a best-case objective. It also provides a new
answer to the longstanding question of why certain rules, such as rst-past-the-post, are more
common in practice.
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1 Introduction
In tightly contested elections, voters whose true preferences are best reected by candidates with no
realistic hope of winning are commonly entreated to vote for a candidate who has a better chance of
success, and whom they prefer to the candidate who would win if they voted sincerely. Some scholars
have argued that such strategic or tactical voting may lead to the selection of a bad candidate,
whereas others take the view that this is rational behavior and may lead to a socially preferred
election outcome. The measurement of the social welfare gains or losses resulting from insincere
voting is consequently an empirically relevant question and is as yet unresolved. We contribute
to this debate by providing exact asymptotic bounds on the equilibrium welfare e¤ects of tactical
voting for an innite class of democratic rules. Our results have practical implications for the choice
of election rules by a mechanism designer facing a worst-case or a best-case objective, and o¤er a new
rationale for why certain rules such as rst-past-the-post (or simple plurality) are more common
in practice than others.
The notion that, under most voting rules, voters can sometimes achieve a more preferred voting
outcome for themselves by misrepresenting their preferences when casting their ballots is perceived
as a major weakness of democratic systems. Charles L. Dodgson complained that strategic behavior
"makes an election more a game of skill than a real test of wishes of electors" (Black, 1958, p. 232).
The underlying concern is that insincere voting will result in welfare-inferior outcomes. Summarizing
this view, Barberà (2011) writes:
"As for the consequences of manipulation, if they occur, there may be many, but the
possible loss of e¢ ciency is particularly worrisome from the point of view of the designer.
Social choice functions that would always select an e¢ cient outcome if voters provide
truthful information may end up recommending an ine¢ cient alternative after voters
distort their preferences in order to manipulate." (p. 739).
The view that preference misrepresentation results in social welfare loss is widespread, but at-
tempts to establish this view formally have proven di¢ cult. Individuals who engage in manipulation
are acting in their self-interest, and expect to gain from doing so (e.g., Ehlers et al. (2004), Schummer
(2004), Campbell and Kelly (2009), Moyouwou and Pongou (2012), Carroll (2013)). Insincere voting
is therefore likely to lead to outcomes which increase the utility of certain voters, but to be harmful
to others as compared to the outcome that would be selected if each individual expressed his true
preferences (Gibbard (1973)). The main di¢ culty in studying the social welfare consequences of in-
sincere voting therefore stems from it potentially having both positive and negative e¤ects, rendering
the alternative outcomes Pareto non-comparable.
In the absence of a particular specication of the social-welfare function, or individual utility
functions, it is unrealistic to expect that much can be said about whether or not strategic manipu-
lation of preferences under the most widely used voting procedures will denitely lead to outcomes
which are welfare-inferior - or, alternatively, welfare-superior - to the outcomes that would prevail
under sincere voting. We consider intensity or positional voting rules, which constitute an innite
class of democratic rules. Importantly, this class includes well-known rules such as simple plurality,
antiplurality (a particular form of approval voting), and the Borda rule. Under these rules, assuming
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that an election involves three competing political candidates, each voter submits a ballot consisting
of his ranking of the candidates, the rst-ranked candidate receiving one point, the second receiving
 points (0    1), and the third receiving 0 points; the candidate who receives the most points
wins. Under simple plurality,  is 0, which means that each voter votes only for one candidate, and
the candidate who receives the most votes wins. Under antiplurality ( = 1), each voter votes against
one candidate, and the candidate with the fewest negative votes wins. Unlike these two rules, the
traditional Borda rule ( = 12) requires that each voter fully rank the candidates. Obviously, our
focus on these rules is justied by the fact that they are the most widely used in elections around the
world. In particular, simple plurality is used in most countries to select presidents, legislators, and
mayors. It follows that our ndings about the welfare consequences of preference misrepresentation
in elections held under these rules have testable implications.
For each of these democratic rules, we compare two di¤erent behavioral scenarios. In the rst,
citizens vote strategically, possibly misrepresenting their preferences in equilibrium. In the "coun-
terfactual" scenario, they vote sincerely.1 The outcomes of these two scenarios are then compared
for each individual, enabling us to calculate the proportion of voters who benet or lose when the
insincere voting outcome emerges as the winner as opposed to the honest outcome. This way to
measure the welfare e¤ect of voting manipulation is natural under our assumption that voters have
ordinal utility.2
The following example illustrates our purpose. Consider an election involving seven voters 1-7
and three political parties a, b and c. Voters 1 to 3 prefer a to b to c; voters 4 and 5 prefer b to
c to a, and voters 6 and 7 prefer c to b to a. If all voters vote sincerely, and the electoral rule is
rst-past-the-post, then party a will be elected, as it will attract three votes, which is more than
the two votes for each of b and c. In contrast, if voters 4 and 5 vote strategically, and cast their
ballots for c rather than b, then c will prevail, which is an outcome preferred by voters 4 through
7, but which makes voters 1 through 3 worse o¤. It is immediately evident that the outcome under
strategic voting is Pareto non-comparable to the outcome under sincere voting, as 57% of voters are
better o¤ if the strategic outcome wins compared to 43% under the sincere outcome.
This example leads to the following important questions which we answer in this paper:
1. How does the proportion of voters who benet or lose from manipulation in equilibrium vary
depending on voters true preferences and the voting rule? What are the limits to these e¤ects
under each rule?
2. What are the practical implications for the choice of an election rule by a social planner or a
mechanism designer?
The analysis below addresses these issues. We show that the equilibrium welfare e¤ects of prefer-
1These two scenarios are natural (e.g., Barberà (2011)).
2 In general, the measurement of social welfare depends on whether or not utility is assumed to be comparable
across individuals. If interpersonal utility comparison is allowed, welfare is usually measured by a weighted sum of
individual utilities. The welfare e¤ect of voting manipulation would then be obtained by subtracting aggregate utility
under the strategic winner from aggregate utility under the sincere winner. Our ordinal utility assumption, which is
also the assumption made in the classical papers of Gibbard (1973) and Sattherwaite (1975), clearly precludes such an
approach. Vickrey (1960) and several subsequent scholars have highlighted the di¢ culty of using cardinal utility in the
evaluation of social welfare. The ordinal approach followed by our analysis also has the advantage of imposing very
little structure on preferences.
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ence misrepresentation depend both on voterstrue preferences and the voting rule. This naturally
implies that the determination of these e¤ects for each rule should follow a partial identication
approach, as the e¤ects vary across elections depending on voterspossibly unknown preferences.
Indeed, we show that it is possible to obtain sharp upper and lower bounds for the proportion of
voters who  in equilibrium  benet from and, conversely, who are adversely a¤ected by the
strategic manipulation of individual preferences. For some rules, strategic misrepresentation may
benet the majority of voters, and under a number of di¤erent social welfare functions it could then
be expected that the equilibrium outcome with strategic voting would be socially-preferred to the
equilibrium outcome with sincere voting. From a policy perspective, and given that the choice is
between electoral mechanisms that are known to be subject to strategic manipulation, there might
therefore be reason to prefer using a mechanism which seems more likely to deliver better outcomes
when citizens vote strategically, rather than one where the expectation is that strategic voting will
lead to an aggregate loss in social welfare. In this sense, our analysis ts into a new research agenda
on mechanism design. Whereas the traditional agenda has been concerned with the construction
of mechanisms that minimize manipulation (see Serrano (2004) for an excellent literature review),
the new agenda investigates mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes in equilibrium, even if these
mechanisms are susceptible to manipulation (see, e.g., Bergemann and Morris (2005), Chung and
Ely (2007), Barberà (2011)).
1.1 Equilibrium Welfare Gains and Losses from Manipulation
For each of the democratic rules analyzed in this study, we determine the minimum and maximum
proportion of voters who gain or lose from a manipulation leading to a strong Nash equilibrium. In a
static political game like the one investigated in our analysis, there are several reasons for preferring
this notion of equilibrium to the notion of Nash equilibrium. From a theoretical viewpoint, the notion
of strong Nash equilibrium is a useful renement of Nash equilibrium.3 The notion of strong Nash
equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium) also more realistically describes voters behavior in modern
societies because it is based on the premise that voters have the ability to act either individually
or coalitionally as is generally observed in ethnic societies or in contexts where a leader may act
as a political coordinator by instructing his followers to vote in a certain manner (Posner (2004,
2005), Fish (2008), Ishiyama (2012), Di¤o Lambo et al. (2015)). In such contexts, members of a
group generally vote as a bloc as opposed to spreading their votes among several competing parties
(Ishiyama (2012)).
For three-party elections, the minimum and maximum proportion of voters who gain or lose from
manipulation in equilibrium are functions of the political rule  and the number of voters n. For
su¢ ciently large electorates (that is, as n goes to innity), these proportions, denoted respectively
by m() and M(), are explicitly derived and presented in Figure 1.
3The concept of Nash equilibrium is often criticized because its predictions are sometimes unrealistic in politics.
For instance, in a plurality election involving any number of voters greater than two and two competing candidates a
and b, and where each voter prefers a to b, the strategy prole in which each voter casts a ballot for b instead of a is a
Nash equilibrium, but it is not a strong Nash equilibrium. The more realistic voting prole in which everybody votes
for a is a strong Nash equilibrium and hence a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Maximum and Minimum Gains from Manipulation in Equilibrium
The proportion of voters who benet from the strategic voting equilibrium outcome winning at the
expense of the sincere voting outcome belongs to the interval [
1
2
;
2  2  2
3  3 ] if 0    
  0:312,
[
1
2
;
1 + 2
2 + 2
] if     12 , and [
2  
3
;
1
2   ] if
1
2
<   1. It follows that manipulation benets
one-half to two-thirds of the population under simple plurality ( = 0) and the traditional Borda rule
( =
1
2
), and one-third to the one-hundred percent of the population under antiplurality ( = 1). It
follows from these results that it is only under antiplurality that manipulation can lead to a Pareto
improvement.
We also quantify the minimum and maximum proportions of voters who lose from manipulation in
equilibrium. The share of voters who lose from manipulation ranges from 1 M() to 1 m(), as,
for each rule , the proportion of voters positively a¤ected by manipulation attains the boundsm()
and M(). In particular, it follows that manipulation hurts one-third to one-half of the population
under simple plurality and the Borda rule, and zero percent to two-thirds of the population under
antiplurality.
Although elections involving at most three major political parties are highly prevalent in real-
life politics, we generalize our ndings to elections involving any number of competing candidates.
Here, we consider simple plurality, the Borda rule, and antiplurality. For each of these rules, we
are able to derive exact bounds on the equilibrium welfare e¤ects of manipulation as a function of
the number of voters and the number of candidates, where the number of candidates is at least
equal to three. In particular, for each of these rules, the exact asymptotic bounds are represented in
Figure 2. In this gure, M(F;m) and m(F;m) are respectively is the maximum and the minimum
proportions of voters who benet from manipulation in a large m-candidate election held under the
rule F 2 fPl;AP l;Bordag, where Pl is for plurality, Borda for the traditional Borda rule, and APl
is for antiplurality. For a large enough electorate, we nd that, in equilibrium, manipulation benets
from half to a fraction of 1   1
m
of the population under simple plurality and Borda, and from a
fraction of
1
m
of the electorate to the entire population under antiplurality. It follows that, whereas
the minimum welfare gain from manipulation is insensitive to the level of political competition under
rst-past-the-post and Borda, it goes to zero under antiplurality as political competition increases.
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Figure2: Maximum and Minimum Gains from Manipulation (m  3)
We argue that our partial identication analysis o¤ers practical advice to a social planner faced
with the task of choosing an election rule for a society when the planner is ignorant of the preferences
of its members. Two main approaches are generally followed in order to compare the performance
of rules or mechanisms, with each approach making a di¤erent assumption on the attitude of the
social planner towards risk. The rst approach is the "worst-case" approach, in which the social
planner assumes that manipulation will always lead to the worst possible outcome. His goal is
then to choose the rule that minimizes this negative e¤ect. This approach has been followed in
several important papers on mechanism designs (see, e.g., Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Segal (2003),
Bergemann and Morris (2005), Chung and Ely (2007), Carroll (2013)). The second approach is
the "best-case" approach, in which the social planner, considering the uncertain welfare e¤ect of
manipulation, assumes that manipulation will always lead to the best possible outcome for the
society. This approach makes an assumption that is similar to the optimistic behavioral assumption
proposed in Greenberg (1996). It is however not very popular in the mechanism design literature. We
also consider a third approach which combines these two classical approaches under a lexicographic
ordering (see below).
Under the best-case approach, the social planner will choose the rule that yields the highest
possible gain from manipulation. In the class of rules we analyze in this paper, antiplurality is the
only rule under which manipulation can benet everybody (see Figure 1 for  = 1 and Figure 2),
and so is the only rule that satises the best-case objective in equilibrium. Under the worst-case
approach, the social planner chooses the rule that minimizes the maximum loss due to manipulation.
Within the class of rules we analyze, the plurality rule, the Borda rule, and all the rules  such
that 0 <  < 12 meet this objective. Our third approach combines the best-case and the worst-
case approaches. Under this approach, the social planner chooses among the rules that minimize the
maximum loss due to manipulation the rule that leads to the highest possible gain from manipulation.
In our context, only simple plurality ( = 0) and the Borda count ( = 12) satisfy these requirements.
Our analysis therefore o¤ers a new rationale for why these two rules are far more common than others
in real-life politics and organizations.4 Interestingly, our third approach to evaluating voting rules
reveals that the rule   0:312 should never be used, as it is the worst-performing rule in three-party
elections.
4As already noted, simple plurality is used in most countries to select leaders. A trivial justication for the popularity
of this rule in large elections is that it minimizes voting cost, as choosing one candidate is less costly than ranking all
the candidates, especially when they are many. Our analysis shows that simple plurality may also be justied on the
ground that it minimizes welfare loss from manipulation.
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1.2 Contributions to the Closely Related Literature
Following the canonical contributions of Vickrey (1960) and Dummett and Farquharson (1961) who
argued that any reasonable voting mechanism is manipulable, and the classical works of Gibbard
(1973) and Sattherwaite (1975) who formally established this conjecture for any non-dictatorial
deterministic mechanism, a number of studies have drawn attention to the potential loss of e¢ ciency
that manipulation can engender (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Sonnenschein (1998), Serrano
(2004), Barberà (2011)). However, the longstanding question of whether or not, in equilibrium, voting
manipulation in a democracy is likely to benet more individuals than are harmed had not been
answered. Also, the question of the exact number of individuals who gain or lose from manipulation
leading to a political equilibrium had not been answered. To our knowledge, this paper is the
rst to address these questions. Our analysis further provides a novel approach to evaluating voting
mechanisms based on the quantication of the equilibrium welfare gains and losses that manipulation
can cause under each mechanism. An interesting feature of our analysis is the assumption that agents
have ordinal utility. We therefore impose very little structure on utility, and so the sharp bounds on
the welfare externality of manipulation that we derive for each rule do not depend on a particular
functional form. We also note that, although we consider only voting mechanisms in this paper, our
approach can potentially apply to a wide range of other mechanisms.
Our analysis ts into a broader research agenda on mechanism design. This literature has been
traditionally concerned with the construction of mechanisms that prevent or minimize manipulation.
Launching this research agenda, Vickrey (1960) wrote:
"An analysis of the ways in which a social welfare function might be set up so as
to minimize the probable inuence of strategy might be interesting, but appears ... to
present formidable di¢ culties." (p. 519).
However, as noted earlier, a recent literature has advocated for a paradigm shift, arguing that the
goal of a social planner should instead be to select a mechanism that guarantees a good outcome in
equilibrium, even if it is subject to manipulation (see, e.g., Bergemann and Morris (2005), Chung and
Ely (2007)). Indeed, if no interesting voting mechanism is immune to manipulation  as shown by
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)  then a more appropriate goal should be to identify those
mechanisms that yield the greatest social welfare gains or that minimize welfare losses in equilibrium;
this is precisely one of the achievements of our analysis.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature on the e¤ect of manipulation. The closest paper
to ours is Moyouwou and Pongou (2012), who determine both the minimum and the maximum
proportion of voters who gain or lose from manipulation by one individual under the innite class
of rules that we consider in this paper. But this paper limits its analysis to only three-candidate
elections. Campbell and Kelly (2014) provide an upper bound on the number of voters who are
harmed by manipulation, but unlike Moyouwou and Pongou (2012), they are not interested in the
number of voters who gain from it. Caroll (2013) quanties the susceptibility of a voting rule to
manipulation, where susceptibility is measured by the maximum expected utility an individual can
gain by misrepresenting his preferences.
A common assumption made in all these studies is that there is only one manipulator. In
Moyouwou and Pongou (2012) and in Campbell and Kelly (2014), the manipulator believes that
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other voters behave sincerely. Therefore, deviation from sincere voting does not necessarily lead to an
equilibrium outcome. Caroll (2013) assumes that the manipulator holds a belief over the preferences
of other voters and manipulates only if the expected gain from doing so is greater than a certain
xed cost. He then derives his measure of susceptibility under the assumption that the manipulator
believes that the preferences of other voters are identically and independently distributed.
Our paper takes an entirely di¤erent approach, in which preference misrepresentation only occurs
as an equilibrium strategy. This approach would be justied under the rational voter model (see, e.g.,
Myerson and Weber (1993)). Indeed, if one voter manipulates, this may induce others to manipulate
as well. It follows that several voters can manipulate at the same, acting either individually or jointly
in order to best-respond to each others action. Vickrey (1960) already made the same point in the
following statement:
"In general, whenever intensity of preference is given e¤ect in the social welfare func-
tion, whether directly as such or through considering the number of intervening ranks,
it will be to the advantage of an individual or a group, whenever it can be discerned in
advance which alternatives are likely to be close rivals for selection as the social choice
and which alternatives are almost certain to be defeated, to exaggerate preferences among
the close rivals, at the expense, if necessary, of understating the relative intensity of pref-
erences for or against the less promising ("irrelevant") alternatives, whether this lack of
promise is due to technical di¢ culty or impossibility or simply to lack of general appeal.
Such a strategy could, of course, lead to counterstrategy, and the process of arriving at a
social decision could readily turn into a "game" in the technical sense. It is thus not for
nothing that we often hear references to "the game of politics"." (p. 517-518).
Consistent with the point made by Vickrey (1960), our analysis views a voting economy as a
"game". It therefore di¤ers from the aforementioned studies on the welfare e¤ect of manipulation
in that it allows for several manipulators who only misrepresent their preferences as an equilibrium
strategy.
Owing to this fundamental di¤erence in our approach, we obtain results that are very di¤erent
from those in these papers. For instance, Moyouwou and Pongou (2012) nd that, in large three-
candidate elections, the proportion of voters who benet (or lose) from the strategic outcome winning
the election at the expense of the honest outcome ranges from 13 to
2
3 if 0    12 , and from 1 2 
to 12  if
1
2    1. Campbell and Kelly (2014) examine a di¤erent set of rules than the one
we analyze. Their set however includes simple plurality and the Borda rule, enabling a limited
comparison with our results. Their ndings imply that, in a three-candidate election, manipulation
hurts at most two-thirds of a large electorate under simple plurality and at least the same proportion
under the Borda rule. These results compare with those found by Moyouwou and Pongou (2012) for
these two rules, but they clearly di¤er from the ndings of the present paper. Our analysis implies
that manipulation hurts at most one-half of a large electorate under simple plurality and the Borda
rule. Importantly, this nding is also true for elections involving more than three candidates. Figure
3 provides a better comparison of our ndings with those in Moyouwou and Pongou (2012) (the
functions m() and M() are respectively the minimum and maximum shares of voters who benet
from non-equilibrium manipulation by only one voter). As the reader can observe, our bounds are
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completely di¤erent.
Figure 3: Maximum and Minimum Losses from Equilibrium and Non-Equilibrium Manipulation
Like our paper, a number of other studies have analyzed positional voting rules in elections
involving three alternatives (see, e.g., Sengupta (1978), Saari (1999), Myerson (2002), Myatt (2007),
Goertz and Maniquet (2011)). There is also a literature on the e¢ cient aggregation of private
information in elections (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), Myerson (2000), Koriyama and
Szentes (2009), Goertz and Maniquet (2011), Bhattacharya (2013)). These papers, however, are
not concerned with the social welfare consequences of manipulation. Also, from a purely conceptual
point of view, we di¤er from most of these studies by assuming ordinal preferences, which precludes
interpersonal utility comparison. In this respect, we also view our partial identication approach
and our use of linear programming in an ordinal framework as a contribution.
Our work also contributes to the broad literature that evaluates and compares mechanisms on
the basis of their performance. In particular, evaluation based on worst-case performance has been
explored in mechanism design theory (Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Bergemann and Morris (2005),
Chung and Ely (2007)), voting (Sprumont (1995), Carroll (2013)), matching (Sönmez and Ünver
(2011)), contract theory (Chassang (2013), Carroll (2015), Frankel (2015)), and pricing theory (Segal
(2003)) among many other applications. The worst-case paradigm, also known as the "conservative
approach", has also been applied to study rational behavior in sequential games (see, e.g., Harsanyi
(1974), Greenberg (1996), Ray (2015), Xue (1998), Moyouwou et al. (2015)). Greenberg (1996) also
advanced the optimistic approach, in which the decision-maker hopes for the best outcome possi-
ble when making a decision that has an uncertain consequence. We have shown that evaluating
voting rules using the worst-case and best-case approaches lead to di¤erent conclusions about their
performance. For instance, a social planner who chooses a rule based on the minimization of the
worst-case-scenario loss should prefer the plurality rule over antiplurality, whereas a social planner
who chooses a rule based on the maximization of the best-case-scenario gain should prefer antiplu-
rality over all the other rules. These ndings mean that our analysis has empirical relevance, as it
concerns rules which are extremely popular in real-life political settings as well as in organizations.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes the problem we study. Section 3
states the main results for three-candidate elections held under the innite class of intensity or posi-
tional voting rules. Section 4 studies an extension to elections involving more than three candidates.
Section 5 derives the implications of our ndings for the choice of an election rule by a social planner,
and Section 6 concludes. For clarity in the exposition, all the proofs are collected in Section 7.
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2 The Problem: Manipulation and Social Benet and Harm
2.1 Notation and Denitions
A society N = f1; :::; ng of n individuals is considering choosing a ruling party or a leader from a
nite set A of political parties or candidates. Following the literature, we rst assume that there are
only three candidates a, b and c, and analyze the innite class of the democratic rules .5 In Section
4, we consider elections involving more than three candidates. We assume n to be su¢ ciently large.
In particular, we derive our main results under the assumption that n goes to innity.
Any nonempty subset of the set N is called a coalition or a group, and the set of all possible
coalitions is denoted by 2N . For any nite set X, jXj represents the cardinality of X.
Each individual i 2 N has a preference relation Ri over A which we assume to be linear,
that is, reexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete. Each individuals preference relation
therefore belongs to the set L = fabc; acb; bac; bca; cab; cbag, where Ri = abc, for instance, means
that individual i prefers a over b over c. An individual i who has preference Ri may nonetheless
choose to cast a di¤erent ballot Qi 2 L, and in this case, we refer to Qi as an insincere ballot or as
a misrepresentation of is true preferences.
A preference prole is a collection of individual preferences. We denote by LN the set of all
the preference proles. Given a preference prole RN and a coalition S, R S denotes the preference
prole obtained from RN by omitting the preferences of all the individuals in S. It follows that any
prole RN can be rewritten as
 
RS ; R S

. To simplify notation, we write R i for R fig. The prole
denoted
 
QS ; R S

is the prole obtained from RN by substituting Qi to Ri for all i 2 S.
Given a linear order R and two candidates x and y, the relation denoted R[y] is obtained from R
only by moving y to the top, and the relation denoted R[yx] is obtained from R only by moving y to
the top and x to the second position.
A deterministic social choice function (SCF) is a voting rule F which maps each voting prole
RN into a single party or candidate F
 
RN

, which is the election winner at RN . In this paper, as
already mentioned, the only SCFs in which we are interested are the voting rules  described in the
Introduction, and denoted by F. These rules include the plurality rule ( = 0), the antiplurality (or
negative plurality) rule ( = 1), and the Borda rule ( = 12); these are the most frequently used rules
in actual elections. Under the plurality rule, each voter votes for only one party, which receives 1
point, each of the remaining parties receiving 0 points. Under the antiplurality rule, each voter votes
against one party, which receives 0 points, each of the remaining parties receiving 1 point. The other
rules, including the Borda rule, better reveal the (strategic) rankings of candidates by voters than
the plurality rule and the antiplurality rule. Under any of these rules, the candidate who receives
the most points wins.
Manipulability. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that any non-dictatorial
deterministic social choice function is manipulable: under complete information of voterspref-
erences, a voter can obtain a more preferred election outcome by not voting according to his true
preferences. A SCF F is said to be strategy-proof if it is non-manipulable, that is, if no voter
5Three-candidate elections under the class of rules  have been extensively studied (see, e.g., Saari (1999), Myerson
(2002), Goertz and Maniquet (2011)), but the questions addressed in the available literature are not those we answer
in this paper.
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can protably misrepresent his preferences. More formally, F is said to be strategy-proof if for
all i 2 N , RN 2 LN and Qi 2 L, F  RNRiF  Qi; R i. A SCF F is strongly strategy-proof
if no group of voters can protably misrepresent their preferences: for all S 2 2N , RN 2 LN and
QS 2 LS , F  RNRiF  QS ; R S for some i 2 S. Strong strategy-proofness is preferred to (indi-
vidual) strategy-proofness in many real-world contexts. As noted by Barberà, Berga, and Moreno
(2016), "individual strategy-proofness is a rather fragile property, unless one can also preclude ma-
nipulations of the social outcome by potential coalitions..." (p. 1073). Following this pertinent
observation, the equilibrium concept we use in this paper is related to strong strategy-proofness, as
this implies that the outcome can be manipulated by individual voters as well as by coordinated
groups of voters.
2.2 Formalizing the Problem
In this paper, we determine the minimum and the maximum proportion of voters who benet or lose
from some voters misrepresenting their preferences. We consider only manipulations that lead to a
political equilibrium.
Consider an election with a status quo. Without loss of generality, assume the status quo to be
a. The election is a one-shot game held under a political rule F biased towards the status quo.6
Let RN 2 LN be a preference prole. Let S  N be a group of voters and TN =  TS ; R S 2 LN a
preference prole such that F
 
TS ; R S

RiF
 
RN

for all i 2 S. We say that RN is manipulable
under the rule F and that TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . Denote by P (F) the set of
manipulable preference proles under F and by U(FjRN ) the set of e¤ective manipulations of RN
under F.
A preference prole RN is an equilibrium if for any coalition of voters S  N and any prole
QS 2 LS , we have F
 
RN

RiF
 
QS ; R S

for some individual i 2 S. If RN is not an equilibrium
(because members of some coalition nd it in their interest to deviate from their true preferences), we
say that RN is (jointly)manipulable or unstable. Denote by SN(FjRN ) the set of equilibria that
are e¤ective manipulations of RN when RN is the prole of true preferences. Assume that RN is not
an equilibrium and let TN 2 SN(FjRN ) be an e¤ective manipulation of RN that is an equilibrium.
We call F(TN ) a political equilibrium at RN supported by TN . Denote by E(RN ; TN ) the set
of all the voters who benet from the e¤ective manipulation of RN leading to the equilibrium TN :
E(R
N ; TN ) = fi 2 N : F
 
TN

RiF
 
RN
g.
Our goal is to determine the maximum and the minimum of jE(R
N ;TN )j
n for large electorates. For
an electorate of size n, these maximum and minimum are respectively:
M(; n) = max
(RN ;TN )2P (F)SN(FjRN )
jE(RN ;TN )j
n (P1)
and
6A one-shot game in our context is a game in which each voter votes only once, the ballots are counted, and a
winner is proclaimed in accordance with the rule F. As is usual in the literature, the status quo bias implies that the
status quo is replaced if and only if it is beaten by one of the challengers under the election rule. Therefore, if there is
a tie, the status quo is proclaimed the winner. This way to break the tie is the alphabetic tie-break rule in our context.
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m(; n) = min
(RN ;TN )2P (F)SN(FjRN )
jE(RN ;TN )j
n (P2)
M(; n) and m(; n) are, respectively, the maximum and the minimum fraction of the voting
population which benets from some group of voters misrepresenting their preferences under F, and
where this manipulation leads to an equilibrium. We would like to evaluate M(; n) and m(; n)
as n goes to innity. Let:
M() = lim
n !+1M
(; n) (P3)
and
m() = lim
n !+1m
(; n) (P4)
We solve problems (P3) and (P4) by bounding M(; n) and m(; n) below and above and
taking the limit of these bounds when n goes to innity (Theorems 1 and 2).We also determine the
minimum and maximum proportion of voters who are adversely a¤ected by manipulation. Given
that voters have strict preferences, these are 1 M(; n) and 1 m(; n), respectively. This partial
identication approach essentially acknowledges that the equilibrium welfare e¤ects of tactical voting
varies depending on voterstrue preferences.
2.3 A Simple Illustrative Example
To illustrate our purpose, we would like to analyze the equilibrium welfare e¤ects of preference
misrepresentation for each of the three canonical rules in an election that involves 8 voters and 3
political parties. Preferences are as follows: R1 = R2 = R3 = bac, R4 = bca, R5 = R6 = R7 = abc
and R8 = cab.
2.3.1 Plurality Rule
Assume that the election is held under the plurality rule. If all voters cast a sincere ballot, then b will
win with four votes. But if voter 8 submits an insincere ballot Q8 = acb, then a and b will tie with
four favorable votes each, and so the tie-breaking rule means that a will win. Observe that the prole
RN is not an equilibrium, whereas the prole (Q8; R 8) is. By misrepresenting his true preferences,
voter 8 gets his second-ranked party elected, which is better for him than the honest outcome b. This
preference misrepresentation benets not only voter 8, but voters 5, 6 and 7 as well. The share of
voters who benet from the manipulation is therefore 12 , whereas the share of voters who are harmed
is 12 . We will see in the next sections that manipulation, in equilibrium, always benets at least half
of the population under the plurality rule, regardless of the number of candidates.
2.3.2 Borda Rule
Assume now that the election is held under the Borda rule. If all voters are honest, then b will win
with 5.5 points versus 5 points for a and 1.5 points for c. But if voters 5, 6, 7 and 8 submit an
insincere ballot Q5 = Q6 = Q7 = Q8 = acb, then a will win with 5.5 points versus 4 points for b
12
and 2.5 points for c. We note that the voting prole QN = (QS ; R S) where S = f5; 6; 7; 8g is an
equilibrium. By misrepresenting their true preferences, voters 5, 6, and 7 get their rst-ranked party
elected and voter 8 gets his second-ranked party elected, which is better for them than the honest
outcome b. As under the plurality rule, the share of voters who benet from manipulation is 12 ,
whereas the share of voters who are harmed is 12 . We will formally show that manipulation always
benets at least half of the population in equilibrium under the Borda rule.
2.3.3 Antiplurality Rule
Assume now that the election is held under the antiplurality rule. If all voters cast a sincere ballot,
then a and b will tie with one negative vote each, and a will win following the alphabetical tie-
breaking rule. But if voters 1 and 2 submit an insincere ballot Q1 = Q2 = bca, then b will win with
only one negative vote against three negative votes for a and two negative votes for c. Note that
the prole RN is not an equilibrium, whereas the prole QN = (QS ; R S), where S = f1; 2g, is.
By misrepresenting their true preferences, voters 1 and 2 get their rst-ranked party elected, and
their tactical voting also benets voters 3 and 4 who also see their rst-ranked party elected, but
the other voters are harmed. We see that voting manipulation benets half of the population in
equilibrium. However, we will see that the minimum fraction of the population that benets from
voting manipulation under antiplurality is less than half in general, and decreases with the number
of competing candidates in large elections.
Importantly, this example also shows that voting behavior depends on the voting rule. We
have also seen that the welfare e¤ects of tactical voting varies across rules. A more formal and
comprehensive analysis is provided below.
3 Welfare Gains and Losses from Manipulation in Equilibrium
In this section, our goal is to identify, for large populations, the maximum and minimum proportion
of voters who, in equilibrium, experience welfare gains and losses from the strategic manipulation of
the electoral outcome. We focus on the innite class of rules  for three-candidate elections. We rst
identify bounds around the minimum (m(; n)) and the maximum (M(; n)) proportion of those
who experience welfare gain as a result of insincere voting for any value of  and for su¢ ciently large
values of n. From these results, we derive the asymptotic bounds. We present a step-by-step proof
of each result in the appendix.
3.1 Equilibrium Maximum Gains
Our rst result identies an upper bound of the maximum proportion of voters who are positively
a¤ected by insincere voting when n  2 and 0    1
2
. The range of voting rules covered by this
result therefore includes the plurality rule and the traditional Borda rule.
Proposition 1 Assume that 0    12 and n  2. Let  = 12
3
p
2
p
3 + 2  13p
2
p
3+2
 0:312. Then:
1. If 0    , M (; n)  2 2 23 3 .
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2. If     12 , M (; n)  1+22+2 .
The second result bounds the maximum proportion of voters who benet from insincere voting
in large elections held under the rules 0    1
2
.
Proposition 2 Assume that 0    12 . Then:
1. If 0     and n  21,
1
n

2  2  2
3  3 n

  2
n
< M (; n)  2  2  
2
3  3 . (1)
2. If     12 and n  36,
1
n

1 + 2
2 + 2
n

M (; n)  1 + 2
2 + 2
. (2)
The third result establishes bounds around the maximum welfare benet of insincere voting for
su¢ ciently large n when
1
2
<   1.
Proposition 3 Assume that n  15 and 1
2
<   1. Then 1  1
n

1  
2  n

M(; n)  1
2   .
From Propositions 1-3, we obtain our rst main result, which identies the maximum proportion
of voters who, in equilibrium, will gain from manipulation in large elections.
Theorem 1 For 0    1,
M() =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
2  2  2
3  3 if 0    

1 + 2
2 + 2
if     12
1
2   if
1
2
<   1
where  = 12
3
p
2
p
3 + 2  13p
2
p
3+2
.
We note that the function M() is continuous. It is also di¤erentiable, except at  =  and at
 = 12 . While under the plurality rule ( = 0), insincere voting benets at most two-thirds of the
electorate in equilibrium, under the antiplurality rule ( = 1), it may lead to a Pareto improvement.
In such circumstances, strategic behavior may be viewed as a virtue, rather than a vice.
3.2 Equilibrium Minimum Gains
In this section, we identify the minimum proportion of the population which experiences welfare
gains from insincere voting. Strikingly, our rst result shows that, in equilibrium, a majority of the
population will benet from strategic manipulation of the voting outcome for the rules 0    1
2
.
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Proposition 4 Assume that 0    12 and n  2. Then m (; n)  12 .
The second result establishes bounds around the minimum share of voters who benet from
manipulation for su¢ ciently large populations when 0    12 .
Proposition 5 Assume that 0    12 and n  37. Then 12  m (; n)  12 + 1n .
The next result is concerned with the rules
1
2
<  < 1.
Proposition 6 Assume that 12 <  < 1 and that n > max

6(+1)(2 )
(4 2 1) ;
3(2 1)
(1 )(4 2 1)

. Then
2 
3  m (; n)  1  1n

1+
3 n

+ 1n .
We conduct a similar analysis for antiplurality below.
Proposition 7 Assume that n  6. Then 13  m (1; n)  13 + 2n .
Having established bounds around the minimum proportion of the voting population which enjoys
welfare gains from manipulation, we now derive our second main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 For 0    1,
m() =
8>>><>>>:
1
2
if 0    1
2
2 
3 if
1
2
<   1
Theorem 2 allows us to study some interesting properties of the minimum welfare gain function
m(). In particular, we note that this function is continuous and is everywhere di¤erentiable, except
at  =
1
2
. It also implies that insincere voting benets at least one-half of the population under the
plurality rule ( = 0) and the traditional Borda rule ( =
1
2
), and one-third of the population under
antiplurality ( = 1).
3.3 Exact Asymptotic Bounds on Equilibrium Gains and Losses from Manipu-
lation
From Theorems 1 and 2, we deduce that the proportion of a large electorate that is positively a¤ected
by preference misrepresentation ranges from a minimum of m() to a maximum of M(). Denote
by G() this interval and let  = 12
3
p
2
p
3 + 2  13p
2
p
3+2
 0:312. It follows that:
G() =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
[
1
2
;
2  2  2
3  3 ] if 0    

[
1
2
;
1 + 2
2 + 2
] if     12
[2 3 ;
1
2   ] if
1
2
<   1.
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Similarly, the proportion of a large population of voters negatively a¤ected by preference mis-
representation ranges from 1  M() to 1  m(). If we denote by L() this interval. It follows
that:
L() =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
[
1  + 2
3  3 ;
1
2
] if 0    
[
1
2 + 2
;
1
2
] if     12
[
1  
2  ;
1 + 
3
] if
1
2
<   1.
It follows that, under simple plurality ( = 0), manipulation benets from one half to two-
thirds of the population in equilibrium (G(0) = [
1
2
;
2
3
]) and hurts from one-third to one half of the
population (L(0) = [
1
3
;
1
2
]). Under the traditional Borda rule ( =
1
2
), manipulation benets from
one half to two-thirds of the population (G(
1
2
) = [
1
2
;
2
3
]) and hurts from one-third to one half of the
population (L(
1
2
) = [
1
3
;
1
2
]). Under antiplurality ( = 1), manipulation benets from one-third to
one-hundred percent of the population (G(1) = [
1
3
; 1]) and hurts from zero percent to two-thirds of
the population (L(1) = [0;
2
3
]). As we will see later, these ndings have an implication for the choice
of an election rule by a social planner facing a worst-case or a best-case objective.
4 An Extension: Elections Involving More than Three Political
Parties or Candidates
We now assume that there are m  3 competing political parties or candidates and we analyze the
equilibrium welfare e¤ects of tactical voting for each of the three canonical positional voting rules:
simple plurality, Borda count, and antiplurality. We again assume that each voter has a linear
preference relation over candidates. Let Ri be the preference relation of voter i, we write Ri = abc:::
to mean that i strictly prefers a over b, b over c, and so on. We write aj :::ak for any preference
relation in which aj is ranked rst and ak is ranked last. Given a linear order R and two candidates
a and b, we notate by Ra;b the linear order obtained from R by shifting only a and b so that: (i) a
or b is top ranked in Ra;b; (ii) the relative ranking of a and b in R is preserved in Ra;b; (iii) the total
number of candidates ranked between a and b is the same in R and in Ra;b; and (iv) R and Ra;b
coincide over An fa; bg. Similarly, we notate by R[b] the linear order obtained from R by only moving
b to the top, and by R[ba] the linear order obtained from R by only moving b to the top and a to the
second position. For example for R = a1a2a3a4a5, we have Ra3;a5 = a3a1a5a2a4, R[a5] = a5a1a2a3a4
and R[a5aa3 ]
= a5a3a1a2a4.
Hereafter the set of candidates is A = fa1; a2; :::; amg and the lexicographic order is the linear
ranking on A for which aj is ranked jth for any j = 1; 2; :::;m. A scoring vector is a vector v =
(1; 2; :::; m) of decreasing real numbers such that 1 = 1 and m = 0. Under the scoring rule
associated with the vector v, k points are given to a candidate whenever he is ranked at the kth
position by a voter; the winner at a voting prole RN is the candidate who receives the most points.
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Denote by Sv
 
a;RN

the total number of points received by a candidate a at a voting prole RN .
Analyzing the welfare e¤ects of tactical voting under any scoring rule as we have done for three-
candidate elections is intractable. For this reason, we will only focus on the three canonical rules
mentioned above. The scoring vector is vPl = (1; 0; :::; 0) for simple plurality (Pl), vAPl = (1; :::; 1; 0)
for antiplurality (APl), and vB =

1; m 2m 1 ; :::;
1
m 1 ; 0

for the Borda rule (Borda). The winner of
an election held under, say simple plurality, will be denoted by Pl(RN ) if RN is the voting prole.
Let RN be a preference prole, TN an e¤ective manipulation of RN under a rule F , and a and
b two competing candidates. We denote by:
1. E
 
a;RN

the set of voters who rank candidate a rst in the prole RN ;
2. E(F;RN ; TN ) the set of voters who benet from the manipulation from RN to TN ; and
3. E(a; b; RN ) the set of voters who prefer b to a under the prole RN .
We denote respectively byM(F; n;m) and m(F; n;m) the maximum and the minimum fraction
of voters who benet from manipulation in an election involving n voters and m candidates and held
under the rule F 2 fPl;Borda;AP lg. As n tends to innity, these bounds are denoted by M(F;m)
and m(F;m), respectively.
For any real number x, we denote by bxc the greatest integer weakly smaller than x and by dxe
the smallest integer weaker greater than x. Formally,
bxc  x < bxc+ 1 and dxe  x > dxe   1 (3)
4.1 Simple Plurality: Equilibrium Maximum and Minimum Gains from Manip-
ulation
In this section, we study the equilibrium welfare e¤ects of manipulation in plurality elections. First,
we show that the winner of a plurality election under a voting prole RN is the rst-ranked candidate
for at least

n
m

voters.
Proposition 8 Let RN 2 LN . If Pl  RN = aj then E  aj ; RN   nm.
The next result states that if the number of voters who prefer the winner aj of an election to
any other candidate under a prole RN is smaller than the number of voters who rank aj rst at a
di¤erent prole TN , and if that number is strictly smaller than the number of voters who rank aj
rst at RN , then TN is an equilibrium given RN .
Proposition 9 Let TN be an e¤ective manipulation of RN under simple plurality. Let Pl(TN ) = aj.
If
E(aj ; al; RN )  E(aj ; TN ) 8l > j and E(aj ; al; RN ) < E(aj ; TN ) 8l < j, then TN is an
equilibrium given RN .
The next result identies the maximum equilibrium welfare gain from manipulation.
Proposition 10 Assume that n  2 and m  3. Then M (Pl; n;m) = 1  1n

n
m

.
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We now identify the minimum equilibrium gain from manipulation, showing that manipulation
benets at least half of the electorate in a plurality election.
Proposition 11 Let n  2 and m  3. Then m (Pl; n;m) = 1n

n
2

.
4.2 Borda Rule: EquilibriumMaximum and Minimum Gains fromManipulation
In this section, we determine the minimum and maximum equilibrium gains and losses from manipu-
lation under the Borda rule. We rst remark that, by denition, whenever a candidate x is preferred
to another candidate y by a voter, the score of x is greater than that of y by at least 1m 1 in the
ranking of that voter.
Remark 1 Let RN be a prole, i 2 N a voter, and fx; yg  A two candidates. Then S  x;Ri 
S
 
y;Ri

+ 1m 1 whenever xR
iy.
The proposition below states that the winner of a Borda election under a voting prole RN is
preferred to any of the other candidates by at least

n
m

voters.
Proposition 12 Let RN 2 LN . If Borda  RN = x, then E  x; y;RN   nm for all fx; yg  A.
The next proposition identies the maximum equilibrium welfare gain from manipulation, which
is identical to the bound found for simple plurality.
Proposition 13 Assume that n  2 and m  3. Then M (Borda; n;m) = 1  1n

n
m

.
We now derive the minimum equilibrium welfare gain from manipulation, nding, like for simple
plurality, that manipulation benets at least half of the electorate in a Borda election.
Proposition 14 Let n  2 and m  3. Then m (Borda; n;m) = 1n

n
2

.
4.3 Antiplurality Rule: Equilibrium Maximum and Minimum Gains from Ma-
nipulation
This section identies the maximum and minimum equilibrium welfare gains and losses from manip-
ulation in an antiplurality election. We nd that tactical voting might benet the entire electorate
in equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Assume that n  2 and m  3. Then M (APl; n;m) = 1.
The minimum equilibrium gain from tactical voting in an antiplurality election depends on the
size of the electorate relative to the number of competing candidates or political parties. If the
number of voters is strictly smaller than the number of candidates minus 1 (that is, n + 1 < m),
then manipulation will benet at least a fraction of
1
n
of the population. Otherwise, manipulation
will benet a greater fraction of the population.
Proposition 16 Assume that n  2 andm  3. Thenm (APl; n;m) =
8><>:
1
n
if n+ 1 < m
1
n

n+1
m

otherwise.
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4.4 Exact Asymptotic Bounds on Equilibrium Gains and Losses from Manipu-
lation
From Propositions 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16, we derive exact asymptotic bounds on the welfare gains
and losses from tactical voting under each of the three canonical rules we have analyzed. The gains
from manipulation ranges from a minimum of m(F;m) to a maximum of M(F;m) for an election
involving m candidates held under a rule F 2 fPl;Borda;AP lg. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The following assertions are true:
1) m(Pl;m) = 12 and M
(Pl;m) = 1  1
m
.
2) m(Borda;m) = 12 and M
(Borda;m) = 1  1m .
3) m(APl;m) = 1m and M
(APl;m) = 1.
The proof simply follows by taking the limit of m(F; n;m) andM(F; n;m) as n tends to innity
for each rule F 2 fPl;Borda;AP lg. Again, an interesting and distinctive property of antiplurality is
that strategic manipulation of the voting outcome may lead to a Pareto improvement. This nding
obtains for the plurality rule and the Borda rule only if the number of candidates tends to innity.
Similarly, the proportion of a large population of voters negatively a¤ected by manipulation
ranges from 1 M(F;m) to 1 m(F;m). If we denote by L(F;m) this interval. It follows that:
L(F;m) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[ 1m ;
1
2 ] if F = Pl
[ 1m ;
1
2 ] if F = Borda
[0; 1  1m ] if F = APl.
5 A Social Planners Problem: Choosing A Voting Mechanism
In this section, we derive the implications of our ndings for the evaluation and comparison of the
democratic rules we have analyzed, and address the problem of a social planner charged with the
task of choosing an election rule. This analysis advances a recent literature which argues that, given
the susceptibility of the most interesting mechanisms to manipulation, a social planner charged with
the task of choosing a mechanism should select the one that ensures a good outcome in equilibrium.
There exist two broad approaches to this problem. The rst is the pessimistic or worst-case approach,
in which a social planner believes that manipulation will lead to the worst loss in welfare and chooses
the rule that minimizes this e¤ect. The second approach is the optimistic or the best-case scenario
approach, in which the social planner believes that manipulation will lead to the maximum gain in
welfare and chooses the mechanism that maximizes this positive e¤ect. We will consider a third
approach which combines both approaches under a lexicographic ordering.
Within our framework, a social planner concerned about worst-case scenarios solves the following
problem:
min
2[0;1]
m() (P5)
And a social planner facing a best-case objective solves the following problem:
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max
2[0;1]
M() (P6)
From Theorems 1 and 2, it is immediately evident that the solution to problem (P5) is any rule
 2 [0; 12 ] and the solution to problem (P6) is  = 1. Given the popularity of the worst-case approach
and the multiplicity of solutions to the worst-case problem (P5), one could rene it. For instance,
the social planner could choose among the solutions to problem (P5) the one that maximizes the
gain occurring under the best-case scenario. In the class of rules we are analyzing, there are two
solutions, namely simple plurality ( = 0) and the Borda count ( = 12).
Simple plurality, the Borda rule and antiplurality therefore emerge from our analysis as having
distinct properties. In general, a risk-averse social planner should choose simple plurality or Borda as
the election rules, whereas a risk-lover or optimistic social planner should choose antiplurality. This
suggests a new rationale for why these rules are the most commonly observed in practice, especially
simple plurality.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to a longstanding debate concerning the social welfare consequences of tac-
tical voting on the outcome of elections in democratic societies. Importantly, our analysis of this
question provides a new approach to evaluating and comparing voting mechanisms based on a partial
identication approach to the quantication of the equilibrium welfare gains and losses that manip-
ulation can cause under each mechanism. It solves the problem of a social planner charged with the
task of choosing an election rule. We have seen that the solution to this problem depends on the
attitude of the social planner towards risk.
Although it is well understood that commonly-used voting rules are susceptible to manipulation
by strategic voters, the extent to which such behavior is likely to harm or benet other voters has
received scant attention in the literature. Our analysis considers a very large class of rules used
to select leaders and policies in democratic countries, and determines the minimum and maximum
proportion of the voting population which, in equilibrium, experiences welfare gains and losses as
a result of insincere voting . An interesting feature of our work is that the results are derived
within the ordinal framework, which puts very little structure on preferences and does not make the
assumption of interpersonal utility comparison. We are also the rst to study this question under
the assumption that deviation from sincere voting leads to an equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the
results obtained under this assumption di¤er markedly from those obtained under the assumption
of out-of-equilibrium manipulation (see Figure 3).
By considering a continuum of rules, our analysis enables the comparison of di¤erent rules by
either the minimization of the worst-case-scenario loss or the maximization of the best-case-scenario
gain. For instance, a social planner who chooses a rule based on the minimization of the worst-case
scenario loss should prefer the plurality rule over antiplurality, whereas a social planner who chooses
a rule based on the maximization of the best-case-scenario gain should prefer antiplurality over any
other rule. In fact, we have seen that, in three-candidate elections, manipulation benets from half
to two-thirds of the papulation under simple plurality, whereas it benets one-third to one-hundred
percent of the population under antiplurality. Our conclusions do not change qualitatively when
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we consider elections that involve more than three candidates. These results also demonstrate the
empirical relevance of our analysis, given that the rules considered in this paper are extremely popular
in democratic countries and in organizations. They also suggest a new rationale for why certain rules
like simple plurality are and should be more common than others.
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7 Proofs
A step-by-step proof is provided for each result. A few preliminary results, of interest in themselves,
are needed to prove certain propositions. In all the proofs, the six possible linear preferences on the
set of alternatives fa; b; cg are labelled as follows: R1 = abc, R2 = acb, R3 = bac, R4 = bca, R5 = cab
and R6 = cba. Each prole RN is associated with its anonymous version x = (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6),
where xj is the total number of voters whose preferences are represented by Rj , j = 1; 2; :::; 6. Given
0    1, we denote by S  u; ;RN the score of an alternative u at RN .
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1, we need to state preliminary results which provide necessary condi-
tions for manipulation to occur. These results are also necessary to prove Proposition 4. The rst
result is stated below.
Lemma 1 Let RN be a preference prole whose anonymous version is x = (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6).
Suppose that a is the winner at RN . Assume that a manipulation can occur at RN in favor of a
political equilibrium b. Then there exists two non negative integers y3 and y6 such that x, y3 and y6
satisfy: (1) the constraints (C1 : C6) (that is, the constraints (C1) to (C6) below); (2) at least one
constraint from (C7 : C9); and (3) at least one constraint from (C10 : C12) where:
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 = 1 (E0)
(  1)x1   x2 + (1  )x3 + x4   x5 + x6  0 (C1)
 x1 + (  1)x2   x3 + x4 + (1  )x5 + x6  0 (C2)
(1  ) (x1   x3   y6) + x2   x4 +  (x5   x6   y3)  0 (C3)
 (x2 + y3   x1)  x3 + (  1) (x4   x6 + 2y6) + x5  0 (C4)
y3   x3  0 (C5)
y6   x6  0 (C6)
x1   (  1) (x2 + x5 + y6) +  (x3   x4   2y3)  x6  0 (C7)
x1 + x2   (1  )x3   x4 + x5   x6   y3   (1  )y6  0 (C8)
(2  ) (x1 + x2 + x5) + (2  1)x3   (1 + ) (x4 + x6)  3y3  0 (C9)
 x1 + (1  ) (x2 + x5)   (x3   x4   2y3) + x6  0 (C10)
  (x1   y3) + x2   x3   (1  )x4 + x5 + x6  0 (C11)
 (1 + ) (x1 + x3) + (2  ) (x2 + x5 + x6) + (2  1)x4 + 3y3  0 (C12).
Proof. Consider  such that 0    1 and a prole RN at which a is elected and a manipulation
may occur in favor of a political equilibrium b. In this proof, we denote by

C 0j

the inequality
obtained from (Cj) by replacing "  " with "  ". We shall proceed in four steps.
Step 1. Let x = (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6) be the anonymous version of RN . Then x satises (E0).
Since a is elected at x, then S
 
a; ;RN
   S  b; ;RN  0 and S  a; ;RN   S  c; ;RN  0.
These yield (C1) and (C2). By hypothesis, S is manipulable from RN to an equilibrium TN by
some voters, inducing the election of b. Let y3 be the total number of bac voters who strategically
report bca and let y6 be the total number of cba voters who now report bca. Then the new prole
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TN is described by y = (x1; x2; x3 y3; x4+y3+y6; x5; x6 y6). Note that by denition of y3 and y6,
we have y3  x3 and y6  x6. Thus (C5) and (C6) hold. Since b is the winner at TN , y is such that
S
 
b; ; TN
 S  a; ; TN  0 and S  b; ; TN S  c; ; TN  0. Expliciting these two constraints
gives (C3) and (C4).
Since TN is an equilibrium, there is no protable deviation from TN . We now prove that x, y3 and
y6 should satisfy at least one constraint from (C7 : C9) and at least one constraint from (C10 : C12).
We proceed as follows:
Step 2. We assume that the assumption that TN is an equilibrium is disrupted by the existence
of a protable deviation from TN in favor of a. This is possible only if a can be elected when all
cab voters now report acb while an appropriate number z1 of abc voters report acb. The anonymous
version of the new prole, say QN , is z = (x1  z1; x2+ z1+ x5; x3  y3; x4+ y3+ y6; 0; x6  y6) with
0  z1  x1. Since a should be elected at QN , z1 is such that S
 
a; ;QN
   S  b; ;QN  0 and
S
 
a; ;QN
  S  c; ;QN  0. For  > 0, rewriting these two conditions, we obtain
z1  max(0; (  1)x1   x2 + (1  )x3 + x4   x5 + x6 + y3 + (1  )y6

) = z 1
and
z1  min(x1; x1 + (1  )x2 + x3   x4 + (1  )x5   x6   2y3 + (1  )y6

) = z+1 .
Clearly, z1 exists only if z 1  z+1 . Equivalently each term from z 1 should be less than or equal to
each term from z+1 . Thus comparing each term from z
 
1 to each term from z
+
1 yields (C
0
7   C 09). Now
for  = 0, (C 09) is implied by (C 07) and (C 08); and S
 
a; ;QN
  S  b; ;QN  0 and S  a; ;QN 
S
 
c; ;QN
  0 immediately yield (C 07) and (C 08). In both cases, (C 07   C 09) hold when QN exists.
Since there should not exist a protable deviation from TN , at least one inequality from (C 07   C 09)
does not hold. This prove that at least one inequality from (C7   C9) holds.
Step 3. Similarly we assume that the assumption that TN is an equilibrium is disrupted by the
existence of a protable deviation from TN in favor of c. To favor the election of c instead of b, all
acb voters should report cab, an appropriate number z6 of cba voters should now submit cab while
the rest of cba voters truthfully report cba. The anonymous version of the new prole, say HN , is
z = (x1; 0; x3   y3; x4 + y3; x5 + x2 + z6; x6   z6) with 0  z6  x6. Since c should be elected at HN ,
z6 satises S
 
c; ;HN
   S  a; ;HN  0 and S  c; ;HN   S  b; ;HN  0. For  > 0, these
amount to:
z6  max(0; x1   x2 + x3 + (1  )x4   x5   (1  )x6   y3

) = z 6
and
z6  min(x6;  x1 + (1  )x2   x3 + x4 + (1  )x5 + x6 + 2y3

) = z+6 .
Clearly, z6 exists if and only if z 6  z+6 . As above, comparing each term from z 6 to each term
from z+6 yields (C
0
10   C 012). Now for  = 0, (C 012) is implied by (C 010) and (C 011); and S
 
c; ;HN
 
S
 
a; ;HN
  0 and S  c; ;HN   S  b; ;HN  0 immediately yield (C 010) and (C 011). In both
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cases, (C 010   C 012) hold when HN exists. Since there should not exist a protable deviation from
TN , at least one inequality from (C 010   C 012) does not hold. This proves that at least one inequality
from (C10   C12) holds.
Step 4. We conclude from the previous steps that x, y3 and y6 simultaneously satisfy: (1)
(C1 : C6); (2) at least one inequality from (C7 : C9); (3) and at least one inequality from (C10 : C12).
From Lemma 1, we obtain nine subdomains Di;j with 7  i  9 and 10  j  12 where Di;j is
dened by:
Di;j = fx : there exist two integers y3  0 and y6  0 such that (E0) , (C1 : C6) , (Ci) , and (Cj)g .
(4)
For each such subdomain, we provide an upper bound of the maximum and the minimum value of
x3 + x4 + x6. This yields Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 below.
Lemma 2 Assume that 0    12 . For each of the three subdomains D7;j for j = 10; 11; 12, the
maximum value M (D7;j) and the minimum value m (D7;j) of x3 + x4 + x6 are such that :
D7;10 D7;11 D7;12
M (D7;j)  2 2 23 3 2(3 )1+7 32 ; 1    12
8><>:
2 2 2
3 3 ; 0    2
6 6+2
3(3 2) ; 2 <   12
m (D7;j)  2 3 
3+2 6+2
3 8 2+3 ; 1    12 2 3
with 1 = 3 
p
5
2 with 2 =
3 p3
3
Proof. In the present proof, we rewrite each inequality (Cj), j = 1; 2; :::; 12, as an equality (Ej) by
introducing a positive slack variable ej .7 For example, (C1) becomes (E1) : (   1)x1   x2 + (1  
)x3 + x4   x5 + x6 + e1 = 0.
Subdomain D7;10: By solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E10) with respect to e5, e6, e3, e4, x1, x2,
x3, x6 and y3, we obtain
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  2  2
3  3   x4 + (  1)x5 +
2y6
2  2 +
(+ 1) e1
3  3 +
(2  1) e2
3  3  
2 (e7 + e10)
2 (1  )2
Since each variable has a negative coe¢ cient, we conclude that M (D7;10)  2 2 23 3 .
Similarly, by solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E10) with respect to e1; e6; e2; e3; e10; x1; x2; x3 and
x4, we obtain
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+
1
3
e4 +
2
3
e7 +
1  
3
x5 + e5
7The same set of notations will also be used to prove subsequent propositions.
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Since each variable has a positive coe¢ cient, we conclude that m (D7;10)  2 3 .
Subdomain D7;11: It appears that D7;11 is not feasible when 0   < 3 
p
5
2 . To see this, rst
assume that 0    0 where 0  0:36445 is the unique solution to 3   8   2 + 3 = 0 that
belongs to [0; 1]. By combining (C1), (C5), (C7) and (C11) as
(C1) +

 
3 +   42
3  2+ 2 (C5) +
3  2  22
3  2+ 2 (C7) +
3  5
3  2+ 2 (C11)
and since each coe¢ cient of this combination is positive, it appears that:
3
2   2+ 3 + x4 +
 
3  8  2 + 3x2 +  6  13+ 22x5 + (1  )  3  2  22 y6
3  2+ 2  0.
This is a contradiction since the left hand side of this inequality is positive for 0    0.
First assume that 0 <  < 1 = 3 
p
5
2 . By combining (E1), (E5), (E6), (E7) and (E11) as
(C1) +

 
4  5+ 2
1 + 3  2 (C5) +
8+ 2   3   3
1 + 3  2 (C6) +
2  
1 + 3  2 (C7) +
 (3  )
1 + 3  2 (C11)
and since each coe¢ cient of this combination is positive, it follows that
x4 + (1  )x5 + 2
2   3 + 5  1
3  2 + 1 y6 +
2   3+ 1
3  2 + 1  0.
This is also a contradiction since the left hand side of this inequality is positive for 0 <  < 1.
Now assume that 1    12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E11) with respect to e5, e6,
e2, e3, e4, x2, x3, x6 and y3, we obtain
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2 (3  )
1 + 7  32 +
 
2  6  2x1 +  (  3)x4 + (1  ) (  3)x5
1 + 7  32
+
(1  2) (  1) y6 + (  3) e1 + (2  1) e7 + (4  2) e11
1 + 7  32
Since each variable has a negative coe¢ cient, we conclude that M (D7;11)  2(3 )1+7 32 .
Similarly, by solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E11) with respect to e6, e2, e3, e4, x1, x2, x3, x6
and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
3 + 2   6+ 2
3  8  2 + 3 +
 
  22x4 +  22   3+ 1x5 +  2 + 3  1 e7
2 + 8  3  3
+
(1  2) e1 +
 
3 + 62   2 e5 +  4  1  22   3 y6 + 2e11
2 + 8  3  3 .
Since each variable has a non-negative coe¢ cient, we conclude that m (D7;11)  3+2 6+23 8 2+3 .
Subdomain D7;12: By solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E12) with respect to e1, e12, e6, e2, e3, x1,
x2, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+
1  
3
x5 +
1
3
e4 + e5 +
2
3
e7
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Each variable has a non-negative coe¤ocient. Thus m (D7;12)  2 3 .
About M (D7;12), rst assume that 0    2 = 3 
p
3
3 . Then by solving (E0 : E6), (E7)
and (E12) with respect to e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, x1, x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  2  2
3  3 +
 
2  6+ 32x2 + (2  1) (2  3)x5 + (1  2) e7
  1   x4
+(2  1) y6   e1   2
3
(2  1) e12
  1 .
Each variable has a non-positive coe¢ cient. Thus M (D7;12)  2 2 23 3 for 0    2.
Now assume that 2 <   12 . Similarly, by solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E12) with respect
to e6; e2; e3; e4; x1; x2; x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
6  6+ 2
3(3  2)  
 (  1)2 x4 + (1  )3 x5 + (1  )
 
3  2   1 y6
(2  1) (2  3)
 (  1)
2 e1 +
 
3  2   1 e7 +   6  32   2 e5
(2  1) (2  3)  
1
3
2e12
(2  1) (2  3) .
Each variable has a non-positive coe¢ cient. Thus M (D7;12)  6 6+23(3 2) for 2 <   12 .
The next lemma concerns the subdomains D8;j , j = 10; 11; 12.
Lemma 3 Assume that 0    12 . For each of the three subdomains D8;j, j = 10; 11; 12, the
maximum value M (Di;j) and the minimum value m (Di;j) of x3 + x4 + x6 are such that:
D8;10 D8;11 D8;12
M (D8;j) 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2 2 2
3 3 ; 0    3
2 4 2+3
4 10+32 ; 3 <   1
2(2 )
3 2+1 ; 1 <   12
8><>:
+22 2
(2+3)( 1) ; 0    4
2+1
2+2 ; 4 <   12
8><>:
2 2 2
3 3 ; 0    13
1+5 22
3+3 ;
1
3 <   12
with 3 = 3 
p
7; 1 =
3 p5
2 4 =
p
17 3
4
m (D8;j)  12 12 12
Proof. Subdomain D8;10: By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E10) with respect to e1, e2, e3, e4, e10,
x1, x3, x4 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2
+
1
2
e8 +
1
2
e5 +

1
2
  1
2


e6.
Therefore m (D8;10)  12 . To deal with M (D8;10), we distinguish three cases.
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First assume that 0    3 = 3 
p
7. By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E10) with respect
to e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, x1,x3, x6 and y6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2 + 2  2
3  3 +
 
2   6+ 2x2
3  3   x4  
2  1
  1 x5
 2
3
 (2  1)
  1 y3 +
+ 1
3  3e1  
1
3
2  1
  1 e10.
Thus M (D8;10)  2 2 23 3 for 0    3.
Now assume that 3 <   1 = 3 
p
5
2 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E10) with respect
to x6; x3; e5; e2; e3; e4; x1; x2 and y6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  4  2 + 3
4  10+ 32  
2 (  1)2 x4
 10+ 32 + 4  
 (  1) (  2)x5
 10+ 32 + 4  

 
2  6+ 32 y3
 10+ 32 + 4
   (2  ) e1 10+ 32 + 4 +
 
2   6+ 2 e8
32   10+ 4  
(  1)  2  6+ 2 e6
 10+ 32 + 4  
2e10
32   10+ 4 .
Thus M (D8;10)  2 4 2+34 10+32 for 3 <   1.
Finally, assume that 1 <   12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E10) with respect to e5;
e6, e2; e3; e4; e8, x2; x3 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2 (2  )
3  2 + 1 +
2   6+ 2
3  2 + 1x1  
3  32
3  2 + 1x4 +
2   1
3  2 + 1x5
  2  4
2
3  2 + 1y3  
+ 1
3  2 + 1e1 +
2  1
3  2 + 1e10.
Subdomain D8;11: By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E11) with respect to e1, e2, e3, e4, e11, x1,
x4, x3 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2
+
1
2
e8 +

2
e5 +

1
2
  
2

e6.
Therefore m (D8;11)  12 .
To deal with M (D8;11), rst assume that 0    4 =
p
17 3
4 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E8)
and (E11) with respect to e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, e8, x1, x3 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
+ 22   2
(2+ 3) (  1)  
3+ 22   1
(2+ 3) (  1)x2  
 (2  3)
(2+ 3) (  1)x4
 (+ 3) (2  1)
(2+ 3) (  1)x5  
 (2  1)
(2+ 3) (  1)y3 +
2
(2+ 3) (  1)e1  
2  1
22 +   3e11.
Since each variable has a non-negative coe¢ cient, we conclude that M (D8;11)  +22 2(2+3)( 1) for
0    4 =
p
17 3
4 .
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Now assume that 4 <   12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E11) with respect to e5, e6,
e2, e3, e4, e8, x2, x3 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2+ 1
2+ 2
  1
2
3+ 22   1
+ 1
x1 +
1
2
 (2  3)
+ 1
x4
+
  1
+ 1
x5 +
1
2
 (2  1)
+ 1
y3   e1
+ 1
+
2  1
2+ 2
e11.
Therefore M (D8;11)  2+12+2 for 4 <   12 .
Subdomain D8;12: By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E12) with respect to e1, e12, e2, e3, e4, x1,
x3, x4 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2
+
1
2
e8 +

2
e5 +

1
2
  
2

e6:
Thus m  (D8;12)  12 .
About M (D8;12), rst assume that 0    13 . Then by solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E12)
with respect to e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, e8, x1, x3 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  2  2
3  3 +
1
2
1  3
  1 x2   x4  
2  1
  1 x5
 
2
(2  1)
  1 y3 +
1
2
1
  1e1  
1
6
2  1
  1 e12:
Thus M (D8;12)  2 2 23 3 for 0    13 .
Now assume that 13 <   12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E12) with respect to e5, e6;
e2; e3; e4; e8, x2; x3 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1 + 5  22
3 + 3
+
1  3
+ 1
x1 +
2 (  1)
+ 1
x4 +
  1
+ 1
x5
+
 (2  1)
+ 1
y3   1
+ 1
e1 +
1
3
2  1
+ 1
e12:
Therefore M (D8;12)  1+5 223+3 for 13 <   12 .
The next lemma concerns the subdomains D9;j , j = 10; 11; 12.
Lemma 4 Assume that 0    12 . For each of the three subdomains D9;j, j = 10; 11; 12, the
maximum value M (Di;j) and the minimum value m (Di;j) of x3 + x4 + x6 are such that :
D9;10 D9;11 D9;12
M (D9;j) 
8><>:
2 2 2
3 3 ; 0    2
1
3
 10+52+6
( 1)(3 4) ; 2 <   12
8><>:
1
6
5 4
 1 ; 0    5
1
3
1+8 22
1+3 2 ; 5 <   12
8><>:
1
3
2+2 2
 1 ; 0    1
1
3
3 4+22
( 1)( 2) ; 1 <   12
with 2 = 3 
p
3
3 with 5 =
p
13 3
2 with 1 =
3 p5
2
m (D9;j)  2 3 2 3 2 3
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Proof. Subdomain D9;10: By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E10) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e4,
e10, x1, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+ e5 +
1
3
e9.
Therefore m (D9;10)  2 3 .
To deal with M (D9;10), we distinguish two cases.
First assume that 0    2 = 3 
p
3
3 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E10) with respect to
e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, x1, x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
2+ 2   2
  1 +
 6+ 32 + 2
  1 x2   x4
+
(2  1) (2  3)
  1 x5   e1  
2
3
2  1
  1 e9  
2  1
  1 e10:
Thus M (D9;10)  2 2 23 3 for 0    2.
Now assume that 2 <   12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E10) with respect to e5; e6,
e2; e3; e4; x1; x2, x3 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
 10+ 52 + 6
(  1) (3  4)  
e10
(  1) (3  4) +
 6+ 32 + 2
(  1) (3  4)x6
+
 (  2)x4
(  1) (3  4)  
  2
3  4x5 +
  2
(  1) (3  4)e1  
2
3
e9
(  1) (3  4) :
Thus M (D9;10)  13  10+5
2+6
( 1)(3 4) for 2 <   12 .
Subdomain D9;11: By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E11) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e4, e11,
x1, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+
1
3
e9 + e5:
Therefore m (D9;11)  2 3 .
To deal with M (D9;11), rst assume that 0    5 =
p
13 3
2 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E9)
and (E11) with respect to e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, x1, x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
6
5  4
  1  
1
2
 
3+ 2   1x2
(  1) (+ 1)  
1
2
 (  2)x4
(  1) (+ 1)  
1
6
(2  1) e9
(  1) (+ 1)
 3
2
2  1
(  1) (+ 1)x5  
1
2
  2
(  1) (+ 1)e1  
1
2
2  1
(  1) (+ 1)e11:
Since each variable has a non positive coe¢ cient, we conclude that M (D9;11)  16 5 4 1 for
0    5 =
p
13 3
2 .
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Now assume that 5 <   12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E11) with respect to e5, e6,
e2, e3, e4, x2, x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
1 + 8  22
1 + 3  2 +
 
3+ 2   1x1
 3+ 2   1 +
 (  2)x4
3  2 + 1 +
(  1) (  2)x5
 3+ 2   1
+
  2
3  2 + 1e1  
1
3
2  1
 3+ 2   1e9 +
2  1
3  2 + 1e11:
Therefore M (D9;11)  13 1+8 2
2
1+3 2 for 5 <   12 .
Subdomain D9;12: By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E12) with respect to e1, e12, e6, e2, e3, e4,
x1, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+
1
3
e9 + e5:
Therefore m (D9;12)  2 3 .
About M (D9;12), rst assume that 0    1 = 3 
p
5
2 . Then by solving (E0 : E6), (E9)
and (E12) with respect to e5, e6, e2, e3, e4, e8, x1, x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
2+ 2   2
  1 +
 3+ 2 + 1
  1 x2   x4   e1
+
(2  1) (  2)
  1 x5  
1
3
2  1
  1 e9  
1
3
2  1
  1 e12:
Thus M (D9;12)  2 2 23 3 for 0    1.
Now assume that 1 <   12 . By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E12) with respect to e5, e6;
e2; e3; e4; x1, x2; x3 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
3  4+ 22
(  1) (  2)  
x4
(  1) (  2)  
1
3
e12
(  1) (  2)
+
1  3+ 2
(  1) (  2)x6  
1
3

(  1) (  2)e9 +
x5
  2  
e1
(  1) (  2) :
Therefore M (D9;12)  13 3 4+2
2
( 1)( 2) for 1 <   12 .
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof. (Proposition 1) Suppose that S is manipulable at a given prole RN . Without loss of
generality, assume that a is elected at RN and that a manipulation can occur in favor of a political
equilibrium b. Then the anonymous version x = (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6) belongs to at least one of the
nine subdomains Di;j described at (4). Thus:
M (; n)  max
7i9;10j12
M (Di;j) :
Using bounds provided by Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, we deduce8 that M (; n)  2 2 23 3 if 2 2 
2
3 3 
1+2
2+2 andM
 (; n)  1+22+2 if 2 2 
2
3 3  1+22+2 . Note that for 0    12 , 2 2 
2
3 3  1+22+2 is equivalent
8A simple way to see this is to sketch the curve of M (Di;j) for each subdomain in order to deduce the maximum
bound.
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to 0    .
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof is done in three steps.
Step 1. We show that M (; n) > 1n
j
2 2 2
3 3 n
k
  2n for 0     and n  21. Assume that
0     and n  21. Let q = 1+3 n and p = j1 23 3n+ 1+3 nk  q. Note that 1 23 3 is decreasing
as  increases from 0 to . Thus 1 23 3n  1 2

3 3n > 3. Thus p 

3 + 1+3 n
   q = 3 and p is a
positive integer. Consider the following proles:
Type Initial prole RN Strategic proles TN
a b c a b b
Preferences b a b b a c
c c a c c a
Number of voters n+ 1  p  q p  1 q n+ 1  p  q p  1 q
Assume that the sincere prole RN is described by the initial prole above. Then S
 
a; ;RN
  
S
 
b; ;RN

= n+ 1  p  q+  (p  1)  p+ 1   (n+ 1  p) = (1  )n  (2  2) p  q+ 2  2.
Since 1    > 0 and p  1 23 3n + 1+3 n   q, we have S
 
a; ;RN
   S  b; ;RN  (1  )n  
(2  2)

1 2
3 3n+
1+
3 n  q

  q+2  2 =  232 + 13  13n+(1  2) q+(2  2). Moreover q >
1+
3 n 1 and 1 2 > 0. Thus S
 
a; ;RN
 S  b; ;RN >  232 + 13  13n+(1  2)  1+3 n  1+
(2  2) = 1. Similarly S  a; ;RN S  c; ;RN = n+1 p q+ (p  1) q = n (1  ) p 2q 
+1  n  (1  )

1 2
3 3n+
1+
3 n  q

 2q+1  =  132 + 23+ 13n  (1 + ) q+(1  ). Hence
S
 
a; ;RN
  S  c; ;RN   132 + 23+ 13n  (1 + )  1+3 n+ (1  ) = 1   > 0. Therefore a
wins at RN .
Now suppose that all cba voters strategically submit bca. The new prole is described by
the strategic prole TN above. At TN , c is Pareto dominated by b. Moreover, S
 
b; ; TN
  
S
 
a; ; TN

= p+ q   1 +  (n+ 1  p  q)  (n+ 1  p  q)   (p  1) = (  1)n+ (2  2) p+
(2  ) q+2  2. By denition of p and q, p =
j
1 2
3 3n+
1+
3 n
k
  q > 1 23 3n+ 1+3 n  1  q. Thus
S
 
b; ; TN
   S  a; ; TN > (  1)n + (2  2)1 23 3n+ 1+3 n  1  q + (2  ) q + 2   2 = 
1
3   13  232

n+q+(4  4)   13   13  232n+  1+3 n  1+4 4 =  13   132n+3 4 
20
 
1
3   132

+ 3  4
= 8+9 20
2
3  83 for 0    . It follows that S
 
b; ; TN
   S  a; ; TN > 0. Therefore b
wins at the new prole TN .
Finally let us prove that TN is an equilibrium. Note that strategic voting from abc voters may
occur only in favor of a while all cba voters would like to favor the election of c. We rst assume
that from TN , all abc voters deviate by submitting acb. At the new prole QN , S
 
b; ;QN
  
S
 
a; ;QN

= p + q   1   (n + 1   p   q)    (p  1) =  n + (2  ) p + 2q +    2 >  n +
(2  )

1 2
3 3n+
1+
3 n  1  q

+2q+ 2 = 1 3+33 3 n+q+2 (  2)  1 3+
3
3 3 n+
 
1+
3 n  1

+
2 (  2) = 1 23 3n +    4  21

1 2
3 3

+    4 = 3 9 21  > 0 for 0    . We deduce that
S
 
b; ;QN
 S  a; ;QN > 0. Thus b still collects more points than a at QN . Now we assume that
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some cba voters act strategically. Note that at the new prole HN , preferences of abc voters and bac
voters are as in the initial prole RN . Since at RN , c initially collects less points than a while cba
voters were contributing the maximum for c, then c can not be elected by unilateral actions from
cba voters. Therefore, there is no opportunity for a protable deviation at TN by any coalition. In
other words, TN is an equilibrium.
Since from RN to QN , both bac voters and cba voters benet from the manipulation, we conclude
that M (n; )  p+q 1n > 1n
j
1 2
3 3n+
1+
3 n
k
  2n = 1n
j
2 2 2
3 3 n
k
  2n .
Step 2. We show that M (n; ) > 1n
j
1
2
2+1
+1 n
k
for     12 and n  36. Assume that
    12 and n  36. Let n = 2k+ r with r 2 f0; 1g, p = n r2 +1 and q =
j
2+1
2+2n
k
 p. Note that
p+q =
j
2+1
2+2n
k
 12 2+1+1 n < n and q  12 2+1+1 n 1  n r2  1 = 2+2n 2+ +12+2r  

2+2n 2 > 0.
Therefore n+ 1  p  q and q   1 are non negative integers. Consider the following proles:
Type Initial prole RN Strategic proles TN
a b c a b b
Preferences c a b c a c
b c a b c a
Number of voters n+ 1  p  q p q   1 n+ 1  p  q p  2 q + 1
Assume that the sincere prole RN is described by the initial prole above. Then S
 
a; ;RN
 
S
 
b; ;RN

= n (p+ q) (1  ) p q++1. Since q =
j
2+1
2+2n
k
 p, it follows that S  a; ;RN 
S
 
b; ;RN

= n  (1 + )
j
2+1
2+2n
k
  (1  2) p+ +1. Taking into account that
j
2+1
2+2n
k
 2+12+2n
and p = n r2 + 1, we obtain S
 
a; ;RN
   S  b; ;RN  12r + (3  r) > 0. In the same way,
S
 
a; ;RN
 S  c; ;RN = n (1  ) (p+ q) q  n+p+2. Thus S  a; ;RN S  c; ;RN =
n   (2  )
j
2+1
2+2n
k
  n + (1 + ) p + 2   . We deduce that S  a; ;RN   S  c; ;RN  n  
(2  ) 2+12+2n n+(1 + )
 
n r
2 + 1

+2  = 2 +12+2 n+3  r(+1)2 > 0. Therefore a wins at RN .
Now suppose that all cba voters and exactly two bac voters strategically submit bca. The new
prole is described by the strategic prole TN above. At TN , S
 
b; ; TN
 S  a; ; TN = 2 (p+ q) 
n+2 p 2. Since
j
2+1
2+2n
k
> 2+12+2n 1 and p = n r2 +1, S
 
b; ; TN
 S  a; ; TN >  12 1+1n+
+ 12r 4. Then for     12 , S
 
b; ; TN
 S  a; ; TN >  12 ( 1)+1 n+ 1 + 12r 4 = F (n).
Noting that  12 
( 1)
+1 > 0, we deduce that F (n) is increasing as n increases for both even values
or odd values of n. Moreover, F (36) > 0 and F (37) > 0. Therefore, S
 
b; ; TN
  S  a; ; TN > 0
for n  36. Similarly, S  b; ; TN   S  c; ; TN = p + q   2   n + p   1. Thus S  b; ; TN  
S
 
c; ; TN

> 2+12+2n  1  2  n+
 
n r
2 + 1

  1 = 12  
2+1
+1 n  12r  (+ 2). For     12 ,
1
2
 2+1
+1 decreases as  increases. Thus S
 
b; ; TN
   S  c; ; TN  512n   12r   (+ 2) > 0 for
n  36. Therefore b wins at the new prole TN .
Finally let us prove that TN is an equilibrium. Strategic voting in favor of a by only acb voters
is not achievable since those voters are already contributing the maximum for a and nothing for
b. In order to advantage c against b, assume that acb voters and cba voters now submit cab. At
the new prole, say QN obtained from TN , p   2 voters report bac, 2 voters report bca and n   p
voters report cab. It follows that S
 
b; ;QN
  S  c; ;QN = p  (n  p+ 2). Since p = n r2 + 1,
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S
 
b; ;QN
   S  c; ;QN = 2   2   r  0. By assumption, r 2 f0; 1g and   12 . Thus
S
 
b; ;QN
   S  c; ;QN  0. Therefore c does not win at QN . We conclude that TN is an
equilibrium.
Since from RN to TN , both bac voters and cba voters benet from the manipulation, we conclude
that M (n; )  p+qn = 1n
j
1
2
2+1
+1 n
k
.
Step 3. The proof is completed by taking into consideration Proposition 1.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Assume that n  15 and 1
2
<   1. For  = 1, suppose that individuals unanimously rank
b rst, a second, and c third. Then under F1, a wins but b wins if an individual strategically submits
bca instead of bac. Since b is unanimously preferred to a, no protable deviation is possible. The
new prole is an equilibrium and M(1; n)  1. Hence M (1; n) = 1.
Now suppose that
1
2
<  < 1.
1. We rst prove that M (; n)  1  1
n

n
1  
2  

. For this purpose, pose k =

n
1  
2  

. Since
1
2
<  < 1, it follows that 0 <
1  
2   <
1
3
and that 1  k 
ln
3
m
. Moreover 0  k 1 < n1  
2   .
Consida prole RN and TN described as follows:
Initial prole RN strategic prole TN
a b a b b
Preferences c a c a c
b c b c a
Number of voters k n  k k n  k   3 3
With sincere votes, S
 
a; ;RN
 S  b; ;RN = (2  )k   n1  
2  

 0 and S  a; ;RN 
S
 
c; ;RN

= n (2  1) k  n (2  1)

n
1  
2   + 1

= n 
2 1
 2 +(1  2)  n2 1 > 0
for
1
2
<  < 1 and n  15. Then a is elected at RN .
Note that n   k  n  
ln
3
m
> 3. Suppose that three bac voters now strategically submit
bca (instead of bac). We obtain a new prole TN at which S
 
b; ; TN
   S  a; ; TN =
3  (2  )

k   n1  
2  

and S
 
b; ; TN
 S  c; ; TN = n  (1 + ) k  3. Since k  1 <
n
1  
2   , we deduce that S
 
b; ; TN
   S  a; ; TN > 4   2 > 0 for 1
2
<  < 1. Moreover,
k   1 < n1  
2   implies that n   (1 + ) k   3 > n   2
n
3
+ 1

  3 = n  15
3
 0. That is
S
 
b; ; TN
 S  c; ; TN. Therefore b is elected at TN in favor of n k voters. We claim that
TN is an equilibrium.
In fact, b is elected at TN . Thus any deviation should be in favor of a or c by only acb
voters. But those voters are already contributing the maximum for a and nothing for b. Thus
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any strategic voting occurs in favor of c by submitting cab instead of acb. Even when we
assume that all acb voters carry such a strategic action, we obtain a new prole QN at which
S
 
b; ; TN
   S  c; ; TN = n   2k   3  n  15
3
 0. Thus b is still elected at QN . This
proves that TN is an equilibrium. Therefore M (1; n)  x3+x4+x6n = 1 
1
n

n
1  
2  

.
2. Now we prove that M (1; n)  1
2   . To see this, we solve (E0 : E4) with respect to
e2; e3; e4; x2 and x3 to obtain
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2    

2  x1  

2  x4  
1  
2  x5  
2  1
2   x6  
1
2  e1
Since for 12 <  < 1, each coe¢ cient that appears is non negative, we deduce that M
 (1; n) 
1
2   .
7.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let 0    . From Proposition 2, we know that 1n
j
2 2 2
3 3 n
k
  2n < M (; n)  2 2 
2
3 3
for n  21. When n tends to innity, the lower bound of M (; n), 1n
j
2 2 2
3 3 n
k
  2n , tends to
2 2 2
3 3 , which is an upper bound of M
 (; n). It follows that, when n tends to innity, M (; n)
tends to M() = 2 2 
2
3 3 .
Let     12 . From Proposition 2, we know that 1n
j
1+2
2+2n
k
 M (; n)  1+22+2 for n  25.
When n tends to innity, 1n
j
1+2
2+2n
k
tends to 1+22+2 , and it follows that M
 (; n) tends to M () =
1+2
2+2 .
Let
1
2
<   1. We know from Proposition 3 that 1   1
n

1  
2  n

 M(; n)  1
2   for
n  15. Then when n tends to innity, 1  1
n

1  
2  n

tends to
1
2   , and thereforeM
(; n) tends
to M() =
1
2   .
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Assume that 0    12 . It follows from Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 that
m (; n)  min
7i9;10j12
m (Di;j) =
1
2
:
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Assume that 0    12 . We show thatm (; n)  12+ 1n for 0     and n  37. Assume
that 0     and n  37. Let p = 1+6 n and q = n "2  p wheren2  = n "2 . Note that " = 0 if n is
34
even and " = 1 if n is odd. Moreover p  14n ; and q = n2  p  n2  14n  n "2   14n = n 2"4  7.
Consider the following proles
Type Initial prole RN Strategic proles TN
a a b b c a a b
Preferences b c a c b b c c
c b c a a c b a
Number of voters q + " p  1 q p  3 4 q + " p  1 p+ q + 1
Assume that the sincere prole RN is described by the initial prole above. Then:
S
 
a; ;RN
  S  b; ;RN = (1  ) "+ (2  4)  0
and
S
 
a; ;RN
  S  c; ;RN = (1  2) p+ (q   5) +  (4 + q) + " > 0.
Therefore a wins at RN .
Now suppose that all cba voters and all bac voters strategically submit bca. The new prole is
described by the strategic prole TN above. At TN ,
S
 
b; ; TN
  S  a; ; TN = (p+ q + 1 + (q + "))  (q + "+ p  1) = 2  (1  ) "+ q > 0
and
S
 
b; ; TN
 S  c; ; TN = (p+ q + 1 + (q + "))  (p  1 + p+ q + 1) = (1  2) p+q+"+1 > 0.
Thus b wins at the new prole TN .
Let us prove that TN is an equilibrium. In fact, given any collective deviation by abc voters
together with acb voters, b scores at least p+ q + 1 points while a scores at most p+ q points. Thus
those voters can not protably deviate from TN in favor of a. In the same way, when acb voters and
cba voters contribute the maximum for c and nothing for b, c scores at most p + 3 +  (p+ q   3)
and b scores at least p+ q   3 +  (q + "). And
p+ q   3 +  (q + ")  (p+ 3 +  (p+ q   3)) = q   (p  3  ")  6  q   (p  "  3) 1
2
  6
 n  "
8
  9
2
+
"
2
> 0 for n  37.
Therefore there is no possible protable deviation from TN in favor of c. We then conclude that TN
is an equilibrium and that m (n; )  q+p+1n = n "2n + 1n  12 + 1n .
The proof is completed by considering Proposition 4.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 6
In order to prove Proposition 6, we need to prove three preliminary results which identify an upper
bound and a lower bound of x3 + x4 + x6 for each of the domains dened in Section 5.1. The rst
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lemma below concerns the sudomians D7;j for j = 10; 11; 12.
Lemma 5 Assume that 12 <   1. For each of the three subdomains D7;j for j = 10; 11; 12, the
minimum value m (D7;j) of x3 + x4 + x6 is such that :
D7;10 D7;11 D7;12
m (D7;j) 
(
not feasible for 12 <  < 1
1
3 for  = 1
2  1
2 3 1
1
3
 6+2+6
3 2
Proof. Subdomain D7;10: We show that D7;10 is not feasible for 12 <  < 1. First assume that
1
2 <   35 . By combining (C1), (C7), (C10) and (C5) as
(C1) +
2 + 
4  4 (C7) +
3
4  4 (C10) +
3  3
2
(C5)
and by setting x6 = 1  x1   x2   x3   x4   x5, it appears, that
3 (1  )
2
x4 + (1  )x5 + 3  5
2
y3 +
2 + 
4
y6 +   1
2
 0:
This is a contradiction since each variable has a positive coe¢ cient for 12 <   35 and    12 > 0.
Now assume that 35 <  < 1. By combining (C1), (C7), (C10) and (C5) as
(C1) +
32   5+ 4
2  22 (C7) +
3  2
2  22 (C10) +
4  42
1 + 
(C5)
it appears that
x4 + (1  )x5 + 5  3
1 + 
x6 +
32 + 4  5
2 + 2
y6 +
(  1)2
+ 1
 0:
This is a contradiction since variables in the left hand side all have positive coe¢ cients and ( 1)
2
+1 > 0
for 35 <  < 1. For  = 1, by solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E10) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e10, x1,
x2, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
e4 + e5 +
2
3
e7 +
1
3
:
Therefore m (D7;10)  13 .
Subdomain D7;11: By solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E11) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e4, x1,
x2, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2     1
2   3  1 +
(2  1)x6 +
 
1  2 y6 +  (+ 2) e5
3+ 1  2
+
(+ 1) e7 + e11
3+ 1  2 :
All variables have non-negative coe¢ cients for 12 <   1. Thus m (D7;11)  
2  1
2 3 1 .
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Subdomain D7;12: By solving (E0 : E6), (E7) and (E12) with respect to e6, e2, e3, e4, x1, x2,
x3, x6 and y3, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
3
 6+ 2 + 6
3  2 +
 (  1)2 x4 + (1  )3 x5 + (1  )
 
3  2   1 y6
(2  1) (3  2)
+
(  1)2 e1 + 
 
6  32   2 e5 +  3  2   1 e7 + 132e12
(2  1) (3  2) :
All variables have non-negative coe¢ cients for 12 <   1. Thus m (D7;11)  13  6+
2+6
3 2 .
The next lemma concerns the subdomains D8;j for j = 10; 11; 12.
Lemma 6 Assume that 12 <   1. For each of the three subdomains D8;j for j = 10; 11; 12,
m (D8;j)  12 .
Proof. Subdomain D8;10: By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E10) with respect to e1, e2, e3, e4, e10,
x1, x3, x4 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2
+
1
2
e5 +
1  
2
e6 +
1
2
e8:
This proves that m (D7;11)  12 .
Subdomain D8;11: By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E11) with respect to e1, e2, e3, e4, e11, x1,
x3, x4 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2
+
1
2
e8 +
1  
2
e6 +
1
2
e5:
Thus m (D7;11)  12 .
Subdomain D8;12: By solving (E0 : E6), (E8) and (E12) with respect to e1, e12, e2, e3, e4, x1,
x3, x4 and x6, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
1
2
+
1  
2
e6 +
1
2
e8 +

2
e5:
which proves that m (D8;12)  12 .
Lemma 7 below concerns the subdomains D9;j for j = 10; 11; 12.
Lemma 7 Assume that 12 <   1. For each of the three subdomains D9;j for j = 10; 11; 12,
m (D9;j)  2 3 .
Proof. Subdomain D9;10: By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E10) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e4,
e10, x1, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+
1
3
e9 + e5:
This proves that m (D7;11)  2 3 .
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Subdomain D9;11: By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E11) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e4, e11,
x1, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+ e5 +
1
3
e9:
Thus m (D9;11)  2 3 .
Subdomain D9;12: By solving (E0 : E6), (E9) and (E12) with respect to e1, e6, e2, e3, e4, e12,
x1, x3 and x4, we obtain:
x3 + x4 + x6 =
2  
3
+ e5 +
1
3
e9:
which proves that m (D9;12)  2 3 .
We are now ready to prove Proposition 6.
Proof. (Proposition 6) Assume that 12 <  < 1 and that n > max

6(+1)(2 )
(4 2 1) ;
3(2 1)
(1 )(4 2 1)

=
n. Let p1 =
j
4 2 1
3+32
n
k
, p2 =

1+
3 n
 p1 1, p3 = n p1 p2. Note that p1+p2 = 1+3 n 1 < n
for 12 <  < 1. Thus p3 is a positive integer. Since

1+
3 n

> 1+3 n  1 and p1  4 
2 1
3+32
n, it follows
that p2 > 1+3 n   1   4 
2 1
3+32
n   1 = 13n 3+3
2+3+1
(+1)   2. By assumption, n > 6(+1)(2 )(4 2 1) . Thus
p2 >
1
3
6(+1)(2 )
(4 2 1)
 3+32+3+1
(+1)   2 = 2 (1  ) 2 5+5
2
2(4 2 1) > 0 for
1
2 <  < 1. Therefore, p2 is a
positive integer. Consider the following proles
Type Initial prole RN Strategic prole TN
a a b a a b
Preferences b c a b c c
c b c c b a
Number of voters p1 p2 p3 p1 p2 p3
Assume that the sincere prole RN is described by the initial prole above. Then
S
 
a; ;RN
  S  b; ;RN = (p1 + p2)  p3 + p3   p1
= (2  )

1 + 
3
n

  (1  )n  

4  2   1
3+ 32
n

+   2
> (2  )

1 + 
3
n  1

  (1  )n  

4  2   1
3+ 32
n

+   2
=
1
3

 
4  2   1
+ 1
 
n  6 (+ 1) (2  )

 
4  2   1
!
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and
S
 
a; ;RN
  S  c; ;RN = (p1 + p2) + p3   p2
= (1  2)

1 + 
3
n

+ n+ 

4  2   1
3+ 32
n

+ 2  1
> (1  2)

1 + 
3
n

+ n+ 

4  2   1
3+ 32
n  1

+ 2  1
=
1
3

 
7    22
+ 1
 
n  3 (1  ) (+ 1)

 
7    22
!
:
For 12 <  < 1 and n > n
, S
 
a; ;RN
   S  b; ;RN > 0 and S  a; ;RN   S  c; ;RN > 0.
Therefore a wins at RN .
Now suppose that all bac voters strategically submit bca. The new prole is described by the
strategic prole TN above. At TN ,
S
 
b; ; TN
  S  a; ; TN = p3 + p1   (p1 + p2)
= n  2

1 + 
3
n

+ 

4  2   1
3+ 32
n

+ 2
> n  2

1 + 
3
n

+ 

4  2   1
3+ 32
n  1

+ 2
=
  2
+ 1
n+ 2  
and
S
 
b; ; TN
  S  c; ; TN = p3 + p1    (n  p1)
= (1  )n 

1 + 
3
n

+ 2

4  2   1
3+ 32
n

+ 1
> (1  )n  1 + 
3
n+ 2

4  2   1
3+ 32
n  1

+ 1
=
2 (1  )
+ 1

n  1
2
(+ 1) (2  1)
 (1  )

:
For 12 <  < 1 and n > n
, S
 
b; ; TN
   S  a; ; TN > 0 and S  b; ; TN   S  c; ; TN > 0.
Thus b wins at the new prole TN .
Let us prove that TN is an equilibrium. In fact, suppose that among abc voters, s voters deviate
and now submit acb. Suppose that at the new prole, say HN , the score of a is greater or equal to
the score of b. That is
S
 
a; ;HN
  S  b; ;HN = p1 + p2   p3    (p1   s)  0
or equivalently,
s  p3 + p1  

1 + 
3
n

+ 1 = n+ p1   2

1 + 
3
n

+ 2.
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Between a and c, we have:
S
 
c; ;HN
  S  a; ;HN =  (p2 + s+ p3)  p1   p2
= n  p1 + s 

1 + 
3
n

+ 1
 (1 + )n  3

1
3
n (+ 1)

+ 3
 3
This proves that a can not win at TN . Therefore there is no protable deviation in favor of a from
TN . Moreover even if all acb voters decide to submit cab, we obtain a new prole, say SN , at which:
S
 
b; ; SN
  S  c; ; SN = p3 + p1   p2   p3
= (1  )n  (2  )

+ 1
3
n

+ (1 + )

4  2   1
3+ 32
n

+ 2  
> (1  )n  (2  ) (+ 1)
3
n+ (1 + )

4  2   1
3+ 32
n  1

+ 2  
=
1
3
(1  )  4  2   1

 
n  3 (2  1)
(1  )  4  2   1
!
:
For 12 <  < 1 and n > n
, S
 
b; ; SN
   S  c; ; SN > 0. Therefore c can not win at SN .
Thus there is no protable deviation in favor of c from TN . In conclusion, TN is an equilibrium. By
denition, m (; n)  p3n = 1  1n

+1
3 n

+ 1n .
The proof is completed by taking into consideration Lemmas 5, 6 and 7, which prove that
m (; n)  2 3 over all the subdomains Di;j above.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Assume that n  6 and let n = 3p+ " with " 2 f0; 1; 2g. Consider the following proles
Type Initial prole RN Strategic prole TN
a a b a a b
Preferences b c a b c c
c b c c b a
Number of voters p+ " p  2 p+ 2 p+ " p  2 p+ 2
Assume that the sincere prole RN is described by the initial prole above. Then
S
 
a; 1; RN
  S  b; 1; RN = p  2 and S  a; 1; RN  S  c; 1; RN = 2p+ 2 + ":
Therefore a wins at RN .
Now suppose that all bac voters strategically submit bca. The new prole is described by the
strategic prole TN above. At TN ,
S
 
b; 1; TN
  S  a; 1; TN = 4 and S  b; 1; TN  S  a; 1; TN = 2 + ":
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Thus b wins at the new prole TN .
Let us prove that TN is an equilibrium. In fact, at TN , S
 
a; ; TN
  S  c; ; TN < S  b; ; TN
and any deterioration of the score of b by abc voters contributes to increasing the score of c. Thus
there is no protable deviation in favor of a from TN . Moreover acb voters have no way to favor
the election of c since they are already giving c the maximum and nothing for b. Clearly, there is
no protable deviation at TN and TN is therefore an equilibrium. By denition m (; n)  p+23p+" 
p
3p+" +
2
3p+"  13 + 2n .
The proof is completed by taking into consideration Lemmas 5, 6 and 7, which prove that
m (1; n)  13 over all the subdomains Di;j above.
7.9 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. By Proposition 6, 2 3  m (; n)  1  1n

1+
3 n

+ 1n for
1
2 <  < 1 and
n > max

6(+1)(2 )
(4 2 1) ;
3(2 1)
(1 )(4 2 1)

. Since

1+
3 n
  1+3 n, if follows that 2 3  m (; n) 
2 
3 +
1
n . As n tends to innity, we deduce that m
 () = 2 3 . For  = 1, Proposition 7 shows that
1
3  m (1; n)  13 + 2n . As n tends to innity, it follows that m (1) = 13 . Therefore m () = 2 3
for 12 <   1.
7.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Let RN 2 LN . E  a;RN ; a 2 A	 is a partition of N . Consequently, E  a1; RN +
::: +
E  am; RN = n. Pl  RN = aj implies that E  aj ; RN  E  al; RN for all l = 1; ::;m.
Therefore m E  aj ; RN  n. That is E  aj ; RN   nm.
7.11 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. The proof is left to the reader.
7.12 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Part 1. Let us prove thatM (Pl; n;m)  1  1n

n
m

. Take RN 2 P (Pl) and TN 2 SN(Pl j
RN ): Pose x = Pl
 
RN

and y = Pl
 
TN

. We have E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = E(x; y;RN )  NnE(x;RN ).
In addition,
E  x;RN   nm by Proposition 8. This implies that E(Pl;RN ; TN )  n    nm.
Consequently, M (Pl; n;m)  1  1n

n
m

.
Part 2. Now we show that M (Pl; n;m)  1   1n

n
m

. We construct two proles RN and TN
such that RN 2 P (Pl), TN 2 SN(Pl j RN ) and E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = n   nm. Pose n = qm+ r with
r 2 f0; 1; :::;m  1g.
Case 1 : r = 0. Consider a partition fN1; N2; :::; Nmg of N in m subsets such that voter 2
belongs to N2 and for all k 2 f1; 2; :::;mg, jNkj = q. Let RN be a prole such that
8i 2 N3; Ri = a3::: and 8i 2 Nk; Ri = aka3:::: for k 6= 3
We have
E  a;RN = q for all a 2 A. So Pl(RN ) = a1. E(a1; a3; RN ) = NnN1. Now pose Q2 =
a3a2::: and TN = (Q2; R 2): We have TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN since Pl(TN ) = a3 and
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a3R
2a1. Moreover
E(a3; aj ; RN )  q;8aj 2 A and E(a3; TN ) = q + 1. Therefore by Proposition
9, TN is an equilibrium. Note that E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = NnN1. So
E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = n   nm.
Case 2 : q = 0. Then n < m. Let R be the lexicographic order on A and dene the prole RN
as follows:
R1 = R[a2] and R
i = R[ai+1a1] for all i 6= 1:
We have
E(aj ; RN ) = 1 for all j = 2; :::; n + 1 and E(a1; RN ) = 0. Furthermore Pl(RN ) = a2
and E(a2; a1; RN ) = Nnf1g. Now pose Q2 = R[a1] and TN = (Q2; R 2). The new prole TN is an
e¤ective manipulation of RN since Pl(TN ) = a1 and a1R2a2. Moreover
E(a1; aj ; RN )  1 for all
aj 6= a1 and
E(a1; TN ) = 1. Thus TN is an equilibrium by Proposition 9. Since E(Pl;RN ; TN ) =
Nnf1g, then E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = n  1 = n   nm.
Case 3 : r  1 and q  1. Consider a partition fN1; N2; :::; Nmg of N in m subsets such that
voter 3 belongs to N3, jNkj = q + 1 if k 2 f2; 3; :::; r + 1g and jNkj = q otherwise. Let RN be the
prole dened by
8i 2 N1; Ri = R[a1] and 8i 2 Nk; Ri = R[aka1] for all k 6= 1:
We have
E(a1; RN ) = q, E(a2; RN ) = q + 1 and E(aj ; RN )  q + 1 for all j  3. Moreover
Pl(RN ) = a2 and E(a2; a1; RN ) = NnN2. Now pose Q3 = R[a1] and TN = (Q3; R 3). We have TN
is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . In fact, Pl(TN ) = a1 and a1R3a2. Since
E(a1; aj ; RN )  q + 1
for all aj 6= a1 and
E(a1; RN ) = q + 1, it follows from Proposition 9 that TN is an equilibrium
given RN . Thus TN 2 SN(Pl j RN ). Note that E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = E(a2; a1; RN ) = NnN2. SoE(Pl;RN ; TN ) = n   nm.
7.13 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Pose n = 2k + r with r 2 f0; 1g. Take RN 2 P (Pl) and TN 2 SN(Pl j RN ): Pose x =
Pl
 
RN

and y = Pl
 
TN

. We have E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = E(x; y;RN ): Suppose that
E(x; y;RN ) <
n
2

= n+r2 ; that is
E(x; y;RN )  n+r2   1. Pose S = E(x; y;RN ) and Zi = R[xy] for all i 2 NnS.
Pose ZN = (Z S ; TS). Since jNnSj = n   jSj  n    n+r2   1 = n+2 r2 . Thus jNnSj > n2 and we
have Pl(ZN ) = x and xRiy for all i 2 NnS. Therefore TN is not an equilibrium given RN . We
conclude that
E(x; y;RN )  n2 . That is m (Pl; n;m)  1n n2  :
To prove that m (Pl; n;m)  1n

n
2

; we construct RN 2 P (Pl) and TN 2 SN(Pl j RN ) such
that
E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = n2 . We consider 2 cases:
Case 1 : r = 0. That is n = 2k. Consider a prole RN such that
Ri = a1a2a3:::am for all i < k; Rk = a3a1a2::: and Ri = a2a1a3:::amfor all i > k:
We have Pl(RN ) = a2 and E(a2; a1; RN ) = f1; :::; kg. Pose T k = a1am:::a2 and TN = (T k; R k).
We have Pl(TN ) = a1 and a1Rka2. That is TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . In addition,E(a1; TN ) = k  E(al; a1; RN ) for all l > 1. By Proposition 9, we conclude that TN is an
equilibrium given RN . We have
E(Pl;RN ; TN ) = E(a2; a1; RN ) = n2 .
42
Case 2 : r = 1. That is n = 2k + 1. Let ff1g; N1; N2g be a partition of N such that
jN2j = jN2j = k. Consider a prole RN such that
R1 = a3a2a1:::; 8i 2 N1; Ri = a2a1a3::: and 8i 2 N2; Ri = a1a2a3:::
Obviously, Pl(RN ) = a1 and E(a1; a2; RN ) = N1 [ f1g: Pose T 1 = a2a3a1::: and TN = (T 1; R 1).
Then Pl(TN ) = a2 and a2R1a1. Thus TN is an e¤ective manipulation ofRN . Moreover
E(a2; TN ) =
k+1 >
E(al; a2; RN ) for all l 6= 2. By Proposition 9, TN is an equilibrium. We have E(Pl;RN ; TN ) =E(a1; a2; RN ) = n2 .
7.14 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Assume that there exist RN 2 LN and fx; yg  A such that Borda  RN = x andE  y; x;RN <  nm. Pose S = E  y; x;RN. Note that jSj  n    nm  1. We have S(x;RN ) =
S(x;RS)+S(x;RNnS)   nm 1+S(x;RE(x;y;RN )). Moreover S(y;RN )  S(y;RNnS) and by Remark
1, S(y;RN )  S(x;RNnS) + jNnSjm 1 . We deduce that S(y;RN )  S(x;RN ) 
n (d nme 1)
m 1  
 
n
m
  1.
Since nm 

n
m
  nm + m 1m , we have 1  n     nm  1   (m   1)   nm  1  m. Therefore
S(y;RN )  S(x;RN ) > 0. This contradicts the fact that Borda  RN = x.
7.15 Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. We rst prove that M (Borda; n;m)  1   1n

n
m

. Consider RN 2 P (Borda) and
TN 2 SN(Borda j RN ). Pose a = Borda(RN ) and b = Borda(TN ). By Proposition 12, we
have
E(b; a;RN )   nm. That is E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = E(a; b; RN )  n    nm. It follows that
M (Borda; n;m)  1  1n

n
m

.
Conversely, to prove that M (Borda; n;m)  1  1n

n
m

, we construct two proles RN and TN
such that RN 2 P (Borda); TN 2 SN(Borda j RN ) and E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = n    nm. For this
purpose, pose n = km+ r with 0  r < m. We consider 3 cases.
Case 1 : k  1 and r 6= 1. Consider a partition Nj , j = 1; 2; :::;m of N such that jNj j = k+1 if
j  r and jNj j = k if j > r. Note that jN1j = jN2j = k + t with t = min (r; 1). Let RN be a prole
such that
8i 2 N1, Ri = a1:::a2,
8i 2 N2, Ri = a2a1:::,
8i 2 Nj , Ri = a2a1:::aj+1aj if 3  j  m  1,
8i 2 Nm, Ri = a2a1:::am.
We prove that Borda(RN ) = a1. Note that E
 
a1; aj ; R
N

= N for each j  3. Moreover
S
 
a1; R
N1
   S  a2; RN1 = k + t and S  a1; RNj   S  a2; RNj    k+tm 1 if j = 2; 3; :::;m. Thus
S
 
a1; R
N
   S  a2; RN  (k + t)   (k + t) = 0. Since E  a1; aj ; RN = N for each aj with j  3
and S
 
a1; R
N
  S  a2; RN, it follows that Borda  RN = a1. Pose T i = a2:::a3a1 for all i 2 N2
and TN =
 
R N2 ; TN2

.
To prove that TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN , we simply show that Bord
 
TN

= a2 since
a2R
ia1 for all i 2 N2. We have S
 
a2; T
N1
 S  a1; TN1 =   (k + t), S  a2; TN2 S  a1; TN2 = k+t
and S
 
a2; T
Nj
 S  a1; TNj  km 1 if j = 3; :::;m. Thus S  a2; TN S  a1; TN  k(m 2)m 1 > 0. In
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the same way, for each l 2 f3; 4; :::;mg, we have S  a2; TN1 S  al; TN1   (k+t)(m 2)m 1 , S  a2; TNl 
S
 
al; T
Nl
  k and S  a2; TNj   S  al; TNj  km 1 if j 6= 1; l. Thus S  a2; TN   S  al; TN 
k   t+ tm 1  0. Therefore Bord
 
TN

= a2.
We now prove that TN is an equilibrium given RN . Since Bord
 
TN

= a2 and E
 
a2; R
N

=
NnN1; we only show that 8S  N1; 8QS 2 LS ; Borda(QS ; T S) = a2. Take S  N1; QS 2 LS ;
and pose QN = (QS ; T S). We have S
 
a2; Q
N
   S  a1; QN  S  a2; TN   S  a1; TN > 0
since S
 
a2; T
N1

= 0 and E
 
a1; T
N1

= N1. Moreover S
 
a2; Q
N1
   S  a3; QN1    (k + t);
S
 
a2; Q
N2
 S  a3; QN2 = (k+t)(m 2)m 1 ; S  a2; QNj S  a3; QNj  2km 1 if j 6= 1; 2; 3 and S  a2; QN3 
S
 
a3; Q
N3
  k. Thus S  a2; QN   S  a3; QN  k t+3k(m 3)m 1  0. In the same way, for each
l 2 f4; 5; :::;mg, that is only form  4, we have S  a2; QN1 S  al; QN1    (k + t); S  a2; QNl 1 
S
 
al; Q
Nl 1
  k(m 2)m 1 ; S  a2; QNl S  al; QNl  k; S  a2; QN2 S  al; QN2  k+tm 1 and S  a2; QNj 
S
 
al; Q
Tj
  2km 1 for all j =2 f1; 2; l   1; lg. Thus S  a2; QN   S  al; QN  3k 2t+(3k t)(m 4)m 1  0.
This proves that Bord
 
QN

= a2. Clearly there is no protable deviation from TN :
Since E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = E(a1; a2; RN ) = NnN1, then
E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = n k = n mn .
Case 2 : k  1 and r = 1. Consider a partition Nj , j = 1; 2; :::;m of N such that 1 2 N1,
2 2 N3, jN1j = k + 1 and jNj j = k if j > 1. Let RN be a prole such that
R1 = a2a1:::a3
8i 2 N1n f1g , Ri = a2:::a1
8i 2 N2, Ri = a1a2:::
8i 2 Nj , Ri = a1a2:::aj if 3  j  m
Note that for each aj with j  3, E
 
aj ; a2; R
N

= N . As above, S
 
a2; R
f1g  S  a1; Rf1g = 1m 1 ,
S
 
a2; R
N1nf1g  S  a1; RN1nf1g = k and S  a2; RNj  S  a1; RNj =   km 1 if j = 2; 3; :::;m. Thus
S
 
a2; R
N
  S  a1; RN = 1m 1 . Therefore Bord  RN = a2.
For each voter i 2 N2[f2g ; consider T i such that T i = a1:::a2 and let TN =
 
R (N2[f2g); TN2[f2g

.
We prove that TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . In fact, S
 
a1; T
N1
 S  a2; TN1 =  k  1m 1 ,
S
 
a1; T
N2
   S  a2; TN2 = k, S  a1; TNj   S  a2; TNj  km 1 if 4  j  m and by denition of
TN3 , S
 
a1; T
N3
  S  a2; TN3  (k 1)m 1 + 1. Thus S  a1; TN  S  a2; TN  (k+1)(m 3)+km 1 > 0. For
each l 2 f3; 4; :::;mg, S  a1; TN1   S  al; TN1  1 k(m 2)m 1 , S  a1; TNl   S  al; TNl  k   1 and
S
 
a1; T
Nj
   S  al; TNj  km 1 if j =2 f1; lg. Thus S  a1; TN   S  al; TN  1m 1 + k   1 > 0.
Therefore Bord
 
TN

= a1. Since N2 [ f2g  E(a1; a2; RN ), then TN is an e¤ective manipulation
of RN .
We now prove that TN is an equilibrium given RN . Since E(a1; RN ) = NnN1; it is enough to show
that 8S  N1; 8QS 2 LS ; Borda(QS ; T S) = a1. Take S  N1; QS 2 LS ; and pose QN = (QS ; T S).
We have S
 
a1; Q
N
  S  a2; QN  S  a1; TN  S  a2; TN  m 2m 1  k(m 3)+k 1m 1  0 since Voter 1
can strategically decrease the score of a1 by at most m 2m 1 points and all voters of N1nf1g are already
contributing the maximum for a1 and nothing for a2. That is Borda(QN ) 6= a2. There is consequently
no lost of generality to assume that S  N1nf1g. For each l 2 f3; 4; :::;mg, we have S
 
a1; Q
N1
  
S
 
al; Q
N1
  1m 1   k, S  a1; QN2   S  al; QN2  km 1 , S  a1; QNl   S  al; QNl  k   1 + 1m 1
and S
 
a1; Q
Nj
  S  al; QNj  2k 1m 1 if j 6= 1; 2; l. Thus S  a1; QN  S  al; QN  (2m 5)(k 1)m 1  0.
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This proves that Bord
 
QN
 6= al. Clearly, TN is an equilibrium given RN .
From RN to TN , a manipulation occurs in favor of
E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = n  (k+1) = n  mn 
voters.
Case 3 : k = 0. That is 2  n < m. Consider a prole RN such that
R1 = a2a3:::anan+1a1an+2:::am, R2 = an+1a2a1::: and Ri = an+1a2a1:::ai if 3  i  n
Note that voter 1 ranks aj at the (j   1)th position for 2  j  n + 1, a1 is (n+ 1)th while aj is
jth for j > n + 1. Moreover for aj 2 An fan+1; a2g, E
 
aj ; a2; R
N

= N . Moreover S
 
a2; R
N
  
S
 
an+1; R
N

= n 1m 1   n 1m 1 = 0. It is clear that Borda
 
RN

= a2. Consider the strategy prole
TNnf1g for members of Nn f1g such that T 2 = an+1a1:::a2 and T i = an+1a1:::ai for 3  i  n. Pose
TN =
 
R1; TNnf1g

.
We prove that TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . Now S
 
an+1; T
N
   S  a2; TN 
  n 1m 1 + 1 + 2(n 2)m 1 > 0, S
 
an+1; T
N
   S  al; TN    n 2m 1 + 1 + 2(n 2)m 1 > 0 for l = 3; :::; n and
E
 
aj ; an+1; T
N

= N for all aj 2 faj : j = 1 or j > n+ 1g. This implies that Borda(TN ) = an+1.
Finally, remark that, E(a2; an+1; RN ) = Nnf1g. Therefore , TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN .
We now prove that TN is an equilibrium given RN . Only player 1 has incentive to deviate
from TN , and only in favor of a candidate of fa2; a3; :::; ang. To see that this is not achievable,
consider a strategy Q1 for player 1 and pose QN =
 
Q1; TNnf1g

. Assume a1 is ranked at position
p by voter 1 at QN and that Borda
 
QN

= aj for some aj 2 fa2; a3; :::; ang. Then S
 
aj ; Q
N
  
S
 
a1; Q
N
  p 1m 1   m 2m 1   n 2m 1  p+1 mm 1 . Since Borda  QN = aj with j > 1, we deduce that
S
 
aj ; Q
N
   S  a1; QN > 0 and that p + 1 > m. Therefore p = m. Thus an+1 is ranked qth by
voter 1 at QN with q < m. This implies that S
 
aj ; Q
N
 S  an+1; QN  q 1m 1   1  2(n 2)m 1 < 0. A
contradiction holds since Borda
 
QN

= aj .
From RN to TN , a manipulation occurs in favor of
E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = n   1 = n   mn 
voters.
7.16 Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. Let RN 2 P (Borda), TN 2 SN(Borda j RN ) and S = E(Borda;RN ; TN ). We claim that
jSj  n2 . On the contrary assume that jSj < n2 . Pose Borda(RN ) = a and Borda(TN ) = b.
Consider fN1; N2g a partition of NnS such that jN1j = jSj and jN2j = n  2 jSj. We have jN2j > 0.
Let ' : S ! N1 be a bijection. Dene QNnS a prole of preferences of NnS voters as follows:
 Q'(i) = Zi for i 2 S where Zi is dened as follows: for all i 2 S; a; b 2 A; aZib holds if and
only if bT ia.
 Qi = R[a] for all i 2 N2 where R = a1a2::: is the lexicographic order.
From the construction of QN =
 
QNnS ; TS

, we have S(a;QN )   S(x;QN ) = S(a;QN2)  
S(x;QN2)  1m 1 for all x 6= a. Consequently, Borda(QNnS ; TS) = a. In addition, aRib for all
i 2 NnS. That is TN is not an equilibrium given RN , a contradiction. We conclude that jSj  n2 .
It follows that m (Borda; n;m)  1n

n
2

.
To prove that m (Borda; n;m)  1n

n
2

; we wish to construct RN 2 P (Borda) and TN 2
SN(Borda j RN ) such that E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = n2 . We consider two cases.
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Case 1 : n = 2k: Take fN1; N2g a partition of N such that 2 2 N2; jN1j = jN2j = k and pose:
Ri = a1a2:::am for all i 2 N1
Ri = a2a1:::am for all i 2 N2nf2g and R2 = a2ama1:::
T i = a1:::ama2 for all i 2 N1.
Clearly, we have Borda(RN ) = a2 and Borda(TN1 ; RN2) = a1. Since a1Ria2 for all i 2 N1;
we conclude that TN = (TN1 ; R N1) is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . It is also an equilibrium
given RN : In fact, only voters of N2 wish to replace a1 by another candidate, candidate a2 specially.
This is not possible since S(a1; TN1)  S(a2; TN1) = k  jN2j. That is RN 2 P (Borda) and
TN 2 SN(Borda j RN ). In addition, E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = jN1j = n2  :
Case 2 : n = 2k + 1. Take ff1; 2; 3g ; N1; N2g a partition of N such that jN1j = jN2j = k   1
and pose:
Ri = a1a2:::am for all i 2 N1, Ri = a2a1:::am for all i 2 N2;
R1 = a2a1a3:::, R2 = a2a1a3::: and R3 = a1a3a2:::
S = N2 [ f1; 2g and T i = a2:::a3a1 for all i 2 S.
We have Borda(RN ) = a1 and Borda(TS ; R S) = a2. Since a2Ria1 for all i 2 S, we conclude
that TN = (TS ; R S) is an e¤ective manipulation of RN . It is also an equilibrium given RN : In fact
and as above, only voters of N1[f3g wish to replace a2 by candidate a1 while a3 is also an option for
voter 3 and only him. This is not possible to realize since S(a2; TS)  S(a1; TS) = k+1 > jN1 [ f3gj.
Obviuosly, voter 3 could not make a3 be elected. That is RN 2 P (Borda) and TN 2 SN(Borda j
RN ). In addition,
E(Borda;RN ; TN ) = jN2 [ f1; 2gj = n2  :
7.17 Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. By denition, M (APl; n;m)  1. Consider a prole RN such that Ri = a2a1:::am for all
i 2 N . Pose T 1 = a2:::a1 and TN = (T 1; R 1). Obviously, APl
 
RN

= a1 and APl
 
TN

= a2.
Since a2Ria1 for all i 2 N , we conclude that TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN and an equilibrium
given RN . Finally, E(APl;RN ; TN ) = N . So M (APl; n;m)  1.
7.18 Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. Case 1 : Assume that n  m. By denition, m(APl; n;m)  1
n
. To prove that
m(APl; n;m)  1
n
, we construct two proles RN and QN such that RN 2 P (APl); TN 2
SN(APl j RN ) and E(APl;RN ; TN ) = 1. Let RN be a prole such that R1 = a3a2:::a1 and
Ri = a2a3:::a1 for all i = 2; :::; n. Pose T 1 = a3:::a1a2 and TN = (Q1; R 1). We have APl(RN ) = a2,
E(a2; a3; R
N ) = f1g, APl(TN ) = a3 and a3R1a1. That is TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN .
TN is an equilibrium given RN . In fact, given a prole QN of the form (T 1; Q 1); for a2 to be
elected, it is necessary for every candidate aj ; j = 1; :::;m to be ranked last by at least one voter in
Q 1 and for a1 to be ranked last by at least 2 voters. This is not possible since jN1nf1gj  m  1.
Since E(a2; a3; RN ) = f1g, we have m(APl; n;m)  1
n
. Moreover, nm(APl; n;m)  1. We
then conclude that m(APl; n;m) =
1
n
.
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Case 2 : Assume that n > m.
We rst prove thatm (APl; n;m)  n+1m . Take RN 2 P (APl) and TN 2 SN(APl j RN ). Pose
APl
 
RN

= al, APl
 
TN

= at, S = E
 
APl;RN ; TN

and k = jSj. Assume k < n+1m . Consider
two integers p and r such that n k = (m 1)p+r with r 2 f0; 1; :::;m  2g :We claim that p  k+1.
In fact, k <

n+1
m

. Then k  n+1m  1  n+1m  1. Since n = k+(m 1)p+r  k+(m 1)p+m 2,
we deduce that k  k+(m 1)p+m 1m  1. That is p  k+ 1m 1 . Hence p  k+1. Given l0 2 f1; 2; :::;mg
such that l0 6= l, let fNj ; 1  j  m; j 6= lg be a partition of NnS such that jNj j = p for all j 6= l0
and jNl0 j = p + r. Consider a strategy QS of NnS voters such that all Nj voters rank aj last for
j 2 f1; 2; :::;mg n flg. Since p  k + 1 and jSj = k, we have APl(QS ; T S) = al. In addition, alRiat
for all i 2 NnS: This is a contradiction since S = E  APl;RN ; TN and TN 2 SN(APl j RN ). We
conclude that k  n+1m .
We now prove that m (APl; n;m)  n+1m . To do this, we construct two proles RN and TN
such that RN 2 P (APl); E(APl;RN ; TN ) = n+1m  and TN 2 SN(APl j RN ). Pose n = mq + r
with 0  r < m. Consider a partition fN1; N2; :::; Nmg of N in m subsets such that voter 1 belongs
to Nm and jNj j =
(
q + 1 if 2  j  r + 1
q otherwise
if r < m  1 and
if r = n  1; jNj j =
(
q + 1 if 1  j  n  1
q if j = n
if r = n  1:
Observe that jN1j =

n+1
m

:
Let RN be a prole such that:
Ri = a1am:::a2 for all i 2 N1
Ri = ama1:::aj for all i 2 Nj with j 2 f2; :::;m  1g
Ri = ama1:::a2 for all i 2 Nmnf1g and R1 = ama2:::a1:
Note that am is never ranked last while any other alternative is ranked last by some voter. Then
APlu(RN ) = am Dene T i = a1:::am for all i 2 N1 and pose TN = (TN1 ; R N1). Obviously,
APl(TN ) = a1 and a1Riam for all i 2 N1. That is, TN is an e¤ective manipulation of RN .
Note that E(Apl;RN ; TN ) = N1. To prove that TN is an equilibrium given RN , it is su¢ cient
to prove that APl
 
Q N1 ; TN1
 6= am for all possible proles Q N1 of NnN1 voters. Assume that
APl
 
Q N1 ; TN1

= am for some Q N1 . Since am is ranked last at
 
Q N1 ; QN1

by jN1j voters,
then by denition of APl, for all j 2 f1; 2; :::;m  1g, aj is ranked last by at least jN1j + 1 voters.
Therefore jN j  (m   1)(jN1j + 1) + jN1j. That leads to the contradiction n + 1  m

n+1
m

+m:
Thus APl
 
Q N1 ; TN1
 6= am and TN is an equilibrium given RN .
In addition, we have,
E(APl;RN ; TN ) = jN1j = n+1m .
7.19 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof is obtained by taking the limits of the functions m(F; n;m) and M(F; n;m) for
each F 2 fPl;Borda;AP lg obtained in Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 (see Propositions 10, 11, 13, 14, 15
and 16).
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